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True Blue? Whether Police Should Be
Allowed To Use Trickery and Deception
To Extract Confessions*
[Homicide detectives] like to imagine their suspects imagining a
small, open window at the top of the long wall [in an interrogation
room]. The open window is the escape hatch, the Out. It is the
perfect representation of what every suspect believes when he opens
his mouth during an interrogation. Every last one envisions himself
parrying questions with the right combination of alibi and excuse;
every last one sees himself coming up with the right words, then
crawling out the window to go home and sleep in his own bed ...
[But] what occurs in an interrogation room is indeed little more
than a carefully staged drama, a choreographed performance that
allows a detective and his suspect to find common ground where
none exists.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Police interrogation is firmly rooted in American law enforcement.
Proponents of police interrogation say it is a vital crime-solving tool.
2
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1. DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 209 (1993). In his
award-winning book, Simon chronicled a year in the Baltimore Police Department's
homicide unit. Simon detailed the real work of the detectives, sergeants, and a lieutenant
who investigated dozens of Baltimore's 234 murders that year.
2. See generally YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed.
Because many criminal cases lack witnesses or physical evidence, 3
police would, in many cases, be incapable of collecting enough evi-
dence to punish the wrongdoer without a confession. Even when
other evidence is available, a police officer will try vigorously to pro-
cure a confession for a variety of reasons: a confession is powerfully
persuasive to a jury;5 it may establish a motive; or it may establish
that the defendant had the requisite mental state of the charged of-
fense.6 Hence, police actively seek to procure confessions, whether or
not they have supplemental forensic evidence, in an effort to mini-
mize the need for further investigation and to secure a conviction.7
Regardless of the vital importance of the confession to effective
law enforcement, a society based on an accusatorial rather than an
inquisitorial system of justice inherently chooses to place limits on
the tactics law enforcement may use to extract confessions.8 An ac-
cusatorial system contemplates a point when the degree of infringe-
ment on a defendant's constitutional rights during interrogation
1990); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed.
1986); FRED E. INBAU, POLICE INTERROGATION - A PRACTICAL NECESSITY, POLICE
POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 147 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
3. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at xiv.
4. For the purposes of this Comment, "confession" includes self-incriminating
statements which may fall short of an explicit confession of the crime.
5. See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987) (White, J., dissenting) (a
defendant's confession "is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can
be admitted against him"); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 140 (1968) (White,
J., dissenting) (a confession is so damaging that a jury cannot be expected to ignore it
even if instructed to do so).
6. GIsLI GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND
TESTIMONY 23 (1992) [hereinafter GUDJONSSON I] (detailing police interrogation prac-
tices, the specific procedures used to extract confessions, and the psychology of both reli-
able and unreliable confessions).
7. The rate at which interrogators obtain confessions from suspects varies from
study to study. Part of the reason for the inconsistency in results is the failure of re-
searchers to define precisely the term "confession." GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 50.
The confession rates for studies that fail to specify the precise meaning of "confession"
range from 42% to 76%, but the rate is as high as 85% when self-incriminating admis-
sions are included with explicit confessions. Id. at 50-53. Another researcher suggests
that more than 80% of all crimes are solved by the suspect making a confession; further,
once a defendant has confessed, acquittal happens very rarely. P.G. Zimbardi, The Psy-
chology of Police Confessions, 1 PSYCHOL. TODAY 17 (1969).
8. E.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (coerced confessions are subver-
sive to an accusatorial system of justice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219 (1941); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 436 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The recognition that ours is an accusatorial,
and not an inquisitorial system nevertheless requires that the government's actions, even
in responding to this brutal crime, respect those liberties and rights that distinguish this
society from most others."). See generally Martine M. Beamon, Comment, Illinois v.
Perkins: Has Our Criminal Justice System Turned From "Accusatorial" to "Inquisito-
rial"?, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 669 (1991); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment To-
morrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 671-95 (1968).
For a helpful comparison of inquisitorial and accusatorial systems of justice, see PILLIP
E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 355-59 (1988). See also Joseph D. Grano, Selling
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becomes too high a price to pay for the resulting confession. For
instance, in modern times, physical torture as a means of obtaining
confessions unquestionably constitutes an impermissible infringement
on constitutional rights.9 Although the settled proscription of physi-
cal coercion clearly sets the outer parameters of improper police con-
duct, the propriety of more subtle forms of police behavior remains
unclear. Beyond the uncontroversial ban on physical coercion, the
line between proper and improper police interrogation conduct be-
comes blurred.
The widespread use by law enforcement officers of trickery and
deception to induce confessions constitutes one important issue in the
modern debate about proper police activity. The use of trickery and
deception in the questioning of criminal suspects is an undisputable
foundation of law enforcement practices.' 0 Police practice a variety
the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law,
84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 687 (1986) (book review) (arguing that the American system is a
mixed system of justice, rather than a purely accusatorial system); Abraham S. Gold-
stein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Proce-
dure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009 (1974).
9. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (convictions which rest upon
confessions procured by torture violate Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
Nonetheless, the problem of using physical brutality to beat a confession out of a crimi-
nal suspect is perhaps not an extinct modern occurrence. See generally Abramovitz,
When Suspects Are Abused, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1979, at 1.
10. See Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 581, 581 (1979) (calling the use of trickery or deceit in the questioning of criminal
suspects a "staple of police interrogation practices"). The frequency with which deceitful
police tactics are reported in newspaper articles also attests to widespread use of such
techniques. "Standard interrogations by Arizona law enforcement officials led to four
matching confessions to the murders of nine people at a Buddhist Temple. But all four
suspects were innocent." Roger Parloff, False Confessions, AM. LAW., May, 1993, at S8.
Parloff emphasizes that even though the police's interrogation tactics produced four false
confessions, "[I]t is quite possible that [the police department] did nothing wrong. In
fact, it seems to have been doing its job just the way police agencies across the nation
have been training their officers to interrogate suspects for years: using isolation, sleep
deprivation, intimidation, persuasion, positive and negative reinforcement, deception, and
trickery." Id.; see also Anne Krueger, Troubled Judge Sends Barstow Man to Life in
'86 Rape-Murder Case, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, July 16, 1992, at B1 ("detectives
lied to [the suspect] by telling him that they had forensic evidence tying him to the crime
when they did not"); Tom Condon, Try Again to Understand the LaPointe Tale, HART-
FORD COURANT, July 12, 1992, at Bl. The suspect signed three separate confessions in a
10 hour interrogation "so he could go to the bathroom, get a drink of water and go
home." Id. The public defenders charged that police "lied, tricked and cajoled" the sus-
pect into signing the confessions. Id. One of the confessions read, "If the evidence shows
I was there and that I killed her, then I killed her, but I don't remember being there."
Id.; see also Steve Jensen, Police Using Deceit to Get Confessions; Psychological Tricks
Challenged in Court; Police Use Psychological Tactics to Get Suspect to Confess,
HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 16, 1992, at B1; Police Tactics Are Questioned by Legal
731
of deceptive techniques, masterfully designed to psychologically co-
erce a suspect to confess. The vigorously debated issue is whether
such tactics should be permitted by law.
The current law regarding proper police interrogation tactics is ex-
tremely ambiguous. Although the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that "[a]ny interview of one suspected of a crime by a
police officer will have coercive aspects to it,"" the Court will not
admit an involuntarily extracted confession into evidence. In deter-
mining voluntariness, a court must ask whether, under the totality of
the circumstances, the "confession [is] the product of an essentially
free and unconstrained choice by its maker,"1 " or the "product of a
will overborne." 13 The Court has failed to define these phrases.
Therefore, even after consulting the case law, a detective who
strives to conduct a proper investigation under the law might wonder
what such an investigation entails. 4 The detective can only guess
where the Supreme Court would draw the line between techniques
which have "coercive aspects" to them on the one hand, and activity
which would overbear a defendant's will on the other. A general rule
is particularly difficult to glean because Supreme Court decisions re-
garding the constitutionality of deceitful interrogation techniques
have generally rested on a case-by-case factual analysis.
This Comment addresses whether or not, and if so, to what extent,
police should be allowed to use trickery and deception to extract con-
fessions from criminal suspects. Part II will first survey the deceitful
interrogation tactics included in the term "trickery," while Part III
will briefly summarize the psychology of confessions. Part IV will
trace the major developments in the law regarding coerced confes-
sions. Part V will inquire what the law should be: should police be
allowed to use trickery to obtain confessions? After exploring the
policy arguments for and against the use of such police interrogation
tactics, this Comment will recommend the prohibition of specific
Experts, PROPRIETY TO THE UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL 1991, Apr. 30, 1991, at Re-
gional News; Lorie Hearn, Court Hits Police Use of Coercion on Suspect, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, July 27, 1993, at B1; Philly Mother Guilty of Slaying Daugther, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Nov. 5, 1993, at A10 (suspect claims she confessed only to end
10 hours of interrogation); Laura Griffin, Confession in Murder Case Upheld, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at 1 (police accused of using a friendly technique to
make defendant think that killing victim was "understandable and not that bad"); J.P.
Sherwood, Virginia Beach Jury Hears Tape of Youth; Detective Says He Tricked Teen-
ager into Admitting Killings, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1992, at C6 (judge admitted three-
hour videotaped statement by defendant even though several deceptions were used to
extract the confession, including a lie by detectives that defendant's fingerprints were
found on the bodies).
11. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977); Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d
329, 334 (8th Cir. 1993).
12. Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
13. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966).
14. White, supra note 10, at 582-83.
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forms of trickery and offer an analytical approach as to whether a
confession is admissible.
II. WHAT Is TRICKERY?
Courts and scholars have not formulated a universal definition of
trickery in the interrogation context. One commentator has summa-
rized that deceptive police conduct intended to induce confessions
falls into three broad categories:
(1) police misrepresentation of a fact, when such a fact, if true, would pro-
vide an affirmative reason for the suspect to confess, or would remove a
reason why he should not confess; [citation omitted] (2) police use of a
verbal or behavioral technique to take unfair advantage of the emotions or
beliefs of the defendant; [citation omitted] and (3) police failure to inform
the suspect of some important fact or circumstance that might make the
suspect less likely to confess. 15
Although this provides a useful general definition of trickery, it lacks
the specificity necessary to illustrate the types of police conduct ad-
dressed by this Comment and its ultimate recommendation.
Police interrogation manuals provide another general overview of
the types of tactics included in the definition of trickery. These inter-
rogation manuals instruct law enforcement officers on how to effec-
tively elicit confessions from suspects through the use of a variety of
deceptive techniques. The leading interrogation manual is Criminal
Interrogation and Confessions by Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and
Joseph P. Buckley, which details a deceptive nine-step interrogation
plan.16 The nine steps are strategically designed to reduce the sus-
pect's reluctance to confess while simultaneously increasing the sus-
pect's desire to tell the truth. In general, this plan relies heavily on
the exploitation of the inherent power differential between the ac-
cused and the police.' 7 Scholars have emphasized that Inbau, Reid,
15. Daniel W. Sakasi, Guarding the Guardians: Police Trickery and Confessions,
40 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1598 (1988).
16. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2. John E. Reid, now deceased, was engaged in the
professional specialty of criminal interrogation for almost 40 years, and aside from co-
authoring numerous articles and books on criminal interrogation, he conducted training
seminars throughout the country personally and by the staff of John E. Reid and Associ-
ates. Joseph P. Buckley was trained by Reid and is the current President of John E. Reid
and Associates. Fred E. Inbau is a leading author in the field of police interrogation. All
three authors fervently advocate the retention of trickery in police interrogation, and
deny that any form of deception implicates a constitutional violation, unless it is so eg-
gregious as to cause an innocent person to confess.
17. Id. at 77-79. The nine steps of interrogation are to be used in cases where the
interrogator feels reasonably certain that the suspect is guilty of the alleged offense. The
nine steps are as follows: (I) "Direct Positive Confrontation": the suspect is firmly told
and Buckley's nine-step plan is inherently deceptive. The plan in-
volves either frightening or tricking the suspect into a confession, us-
ing such tactics as offering false sympathy, blaming the victim,
offering excuses, or minimizing the seriousness of the charges. 18
However, it is important to have a more detailed working knowl-
edge of the types of conduct included in the definition of trickery for
purposes of this Comment. The most effective way to construct a
detailed definition of police trickery is to examine the types of con-
duct labeled as such by the courts. Case law indicates that trickery
or deception19 includes a wide range of techniques such as good cop-
that the interrogator is undeterrably confident of the suspect's guilt, even if the interroga-
tor has no evidence against the suspect; (2) "Theme Development": the interrogator sug-
gests various themes to the suspect in order to morally justify the crime in the suspect's
mind; (3) "Handling Denials": the interrogator attempts to prevent the suspect from
verbalizing denials by maintaining a monologue. The good-cop/bad-cop routine is espe-
cially effective here; (4) "Overcoming Objections": the interrogator is instructed about a
variety of ways to overcome the objections that the uspect may give as an explanation or
reasoning for his innocence; (5) "Procurement and Retention of Suspect's Attention": the
interrogator moves physically close to the suspect, touching the suspect, mentioning the
suspect's first name, and maintaining good eye contact in order to maintain the suspect's
interest and attention and to make the suspect more attentive to the interrogator's sug-
gestions; (6) "Handling the Suspect's Passive Mood": as the suspect appears attentive,
the interrogator exhibits signs of understanding and sympathy, or appeals to the suspect's
sense of decency, honor, or religion to urge the suspect to confess; (7) "Presenting an
Alternative Question": the suspect is presented with two possible alternatives, both of
which are incriminating, for the commission of the crime. Of the two incriminating alter-
natives, one choice appears to be justified and the other is plainly morally repulsive; (8)
"Having Suspect Orally Relate Various Details of the Offense": once the suspect has
made a choice in step 7, the initial admission is expanded into a full-blown detailed
confession; (9) "Converting an Oral Confession into a Written Confession": oral state-
ments are reduced to written or recorded form and voluntariness of the statement is
established along with corroboration of material details. The suspect signs the statement
in the presence of two or more persons. Id.
18. Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions:
Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAw Hum. BEHAV.
233, 235 (1991).
19. "Trickery" is not the only terminology used by courts to describe the type of
conduct with which this Comment is concerned. Other terms for "trickery" used by
courts include deception, misrepresentation, fabrication, artifice, fraud, deceit, and sub-
terfuge. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 44 Cal. 3d 375, 749 P.2d 279, 243 Cal. Rptr. 842
(1988); People v. Hogan, 31 Cal. 3d 815, 840, 647 P.2d 93, 108, 183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 832
(1982) ("deception"); People v. Houston, 36 Ill. App. 3d 695, 698, 702, 344 N.E.2d 641,
644, 647 (1976) ("subterfuge" and "misrepresentation"); People v. Arguello, 65 Cal. 2d
768, 774-75, 423 P.2d 202, 206, 56 Cal. Rptr. 274, 278 (1967) ("subterfuge" and
"deception").
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bad cop,20 the "tag team" approach,21 the reverse line up,22 the pro-
duction of false evidence,23 lies regarding the evidence collected
against the suspect,24 lies about whether an interrogation is in fact
20. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 452 (1966); United States v.
Ellis, 595 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1979); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42
Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965); State v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 566, 703 P.2d 510 (Ct. App. 1985).
See generally David Abney, Mutt and Jeff Meet the Constitution, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 118
(1986); White, supra note 10, at 625-28; INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 62.
21. See, e.g., People v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126
(1993) (murder conviction overturned because "outrageous" police tactics, which in-
cluded fresh officers rotating interrogation duties over the course of an eight hour interro-
gation, violated the defendant's constitutional rights).
22. The suspect is confidently pointed out of a line up by a coached person, who
poses as a witness. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 453 (1966).
23. See, e.g., Florida v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (hold-
ing that police overstepped the line of permitted police deception when police fabricated
laboratory reports and exhibited the falsified documents to defendant during the interro-
gation in attempt to secure confession).
24. Interrogators falsely tell suspect that they have evidence that proves the sus-
pect is guilty. See, e.g., Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1473-77, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-
44 (detectives told the murder suspect that the victim made a dying declaration that
implicated the suspect, that the suspect's fingerprints were found on the victim's neck,
that the suspect's fingerprints were found on the fatal bullet, that there was a witness to
the killing, and that gunshot residue was found on the suspect's hands - all of which were
false); Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 332 (8th Cir. 1993) (police officers falsely inti-
mated that the suspect's husband was "putting all the blame on her"); State v. Jackson,
308 N.C. 549, 567-68, 304 S.E.2d 134, 144 (1983) (detective falsely told the murder
suspect that bloodstains had been found on the suspect's pants and shoes, that the sus-
pect's shoes matched footprints found at the crime scene, that the suspect's fingerprints
were on the murder weapon, and that a witness had seen the suspect running from the
crime scene); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 493 (1977) (police falsely stated that
defendant's fingerprints were found at the burglary scene); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S.
731, 737-39 (1969) (upholding the validity of falsely telling a suspect that his crime
partner had confessed).
taking place, 5 lies about the detective's adversarial role in the inter-
rogation,26 lies about the seriousness of the proceedings or the possi-
ble consequences of a confession,21 and vague and indefinite promises
of leniency.2 Each of these tactics is advocated in police training
manuals and widely used by interrogating officers across America.29
III. PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFESSIONS
In order to decide whether certain interrogation practices should
be prohibited, it is important to understand what makes psychologi-
cal tactics so effective. Experts have conducted countless studies in
search of the reasons why suspects confess during police interroga-
tion. There are five main theoretical models about confessions, each
of which focuses on different aspects of the interrogation process. 0
25. E.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (defendant's incrimi-
nating statements admissible when made to a friend who was cooperating with the gov-
ernment and wearing a recording device); see White, supra note 10, at 602-08. Professor
White concludes that this form of deception undermines the defendant's Fifth and Sixth
Amendment protections. White argues that the defendant in Massiah was deprived of
his Sixth Amendment privileges because, due to governmental deception, the defendant
was unaware that he was in fact under interrogation by a government agent. Id. at 603.
White concludes that "[a] practice that makes the suspect unaware that the police are
interrogating him, and therefore is likely to remove from his consideration the question
whether he should have counsel present, clearly creates an unacceptable risk of infringe-
ment of the suspect's constitutional rights." Id.
26. This category includes the good cop-bad cop routine. Another tactic included
in this category is the misrepresentation of the law enforcement officer's identity. See
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) (suspect provided with a physician who was actu-
ally a police psychiatrist, and suspect confessed after the "physician" assured him that
the suspect was not at fault and the police would be lenient); Illinois v. Perkins, 469 U.S.
292, 294-95 (1990) (suspect confessed to committing murder to undercover agent who
was posing as a fellow inmate).
27. See, e.g., People v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126
(1993) (in an effort to misrepresent the seriousness of the situation, detectives failed to
tell suspect for a considerable amount of time that the murder victim had in fact died).
28. Although explicit promises of leniency have been presumed to be coercive since
1897, courts continue to permit vague and indefinite promises of leniency. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding validity of confession resulting
when police repeatedly told suspect that he had mental problems and thus needed psy-
chological *treatment rather than punishment).
29. White, supra note 10, at 581-82; INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 77-79. For a
general discussion regarding different tactics employed by interrogators see supra note
10 and accompanying text.
30. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson & I. Bownes, The Reasons Why Suspects Confess
During Custodial Interrogation: Data for Nothern Ireland, 32 MED. Sci. & L. 204, 204
(1992). Gudjonsson and Bownes.summarize the five theoretical models about confessions
as:
(i) "The Reid Model of Confession," where confessions are seen as a result
of subtle psychological manipulation to overcome resistance and deception; (ii)
"A Decision-Making Model of Confession," where an attempt is made to draw
attention to the kind of factors that influence the suspect's decision-making
during interrogation; (iii) "A Cognitive-Behavioural Model of Confession,"
where confessions are viewed in terms of their 'antecedents' and 'perceived con-
sequences;' (iv) "Psychoanalytic Models of Confession," where confessions are
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After studying the five theories as a group, Dr. Gisli Gudjonsson31
has observed three common general factors responsible for most
confessions:
(1) perception of proof, where the suspect believes that there is no point in
denying the allegation as the police will eventually prove his or her involve-
ment; (2) internal need to tell the police about [his or her] criminal deed;
(3) external pressure, such as police persuasion and fear of confinement.3 2
The focus of this Comment is on the proper legal scope of the third
factor, i.e., external pressure consisting of the interrogator's use of
deceptive psychological persuasion. The first factor, the suspect's
perception of proof, is related to external pressure, because police
frequently misrepresent the strength of proof regarding the suspect's
guilt.
However, even when police misrepresent or falsify proof of a sus-
pect's guilt, and the "external pressures" are masterfully used, not
all suspects who undergo interrogation confess to the crime of which
they are accused. Therefore, it is important to briefly consider
whether there are certain characteristics which make a suspect more
prone to deceptive police interrogation tactics, and hence, more
seen as arising from internal conflict and feelings of guilt; (v) "An Interaction
Process Model of Confession," where the outcome of interrogation is seen as
resulting from the interaction of background variables and contextual
characteristics.
Id. For a more detailed survey of the five theoretical models of interrogation, see
GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 61-72. For a detailed explanation of each model of
interrogation by the authors of each theoretical model, see Brian C. Jayne, The Psycho-
logical Principles of Criminal Interrogation, in CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFES-
SIONS app. at 327-47 (1986) (Reid Model); E.L. Hilgendorf & B. Irving, A Decision-
Making Model of Confessions, in PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS: APPLICATIONS
AND LIMITATIONS 67-84 (1981) (DECISION-MAKING MODEL); GISLI H. GUDJONSSON,
The Psychology of False Confessions, 57 MED. L.J. 93 (1989) (Cognitive-Behavioral
Model); E. BERGGREN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFESSIONS (1975) (Psychoanalytic
Model); T. REIK, THE COMPULSION TO CONFESS: ON THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT (1959) (Psychoanalytic Model); F.C. Redlich et al., Narcoanalysis
and the Truth, 107 AM. PSYCHIATRY 586 (1951) (Psychoanalytic Model); S. Moston et
al., The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour, Address presented at the
British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Swansea University (Apr. 5, 1990)(Interaction Process Model).
31. Dr. Gudjonsson is a prolific author in the field of criminal psychology, and acts
regularly as a consultant to police in England, as well as appearing as an expert witness
in many criminal cases. He pioneered the empirical measurement of suggestibility, which
he has applied in a number of landmark cases. He is also a senior lecturer in psychology
at the Institute of Psychiatry, University of London, and the head of forensic psychology
services at the Maudsley and Bethlem Royal Hospitals.
32. Gudjonsson & Bownes, supra note 30, at 204.
likely to confess. Studies suggest that there are certain types of sus-
pects who are more likely to confess than others.3 1 Some studies indi-
cate that age is a factor which tends to influence whether or not a
suspect confesses. In general, the younger the suspect, the easier it is
to obtain a confession from him or her. 4 There is also evidence that
indicates that suspects confess more readily to some types of offenses
than others.35 Finally, first-time offenders might be less likely to con-
fess than suspects who have had several previous convictions.38
Any effective legal framework for the use of trickery to extract
confessions must take into consideration the reasons why suspects
confess. Without an understanding of the pressures that motivate a
suspect to confess, one would likely fail to appropriately assess the
magnitude of the persuasion that trickery exerts upon a suspect.
IV. WHAT Is THE LAW?
The development of the law governing the exclusion of confessions
reflects the classic conflict between law enforcement interests and the
protection of a defendant's constitutional rights. In order to propose
33. See GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 54-58.
34. Experts attribute the ability of older suspects to resist interrogation pressures
to life experience, maturation, and a greater ability to understand and assert their legal
rights. See L.S. Leiken, Police Interrogation in Colorado: The Implementation of Mi-
randa, 47 DENV. L.J. 1 (1970); Thomas Grisso, Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda
Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1980). Grisso's study reported
that juveniles as a class do not understand their Miranda rights. Id. Consequently, the
researcher concluded that juveniles' comprehension "is so deficient as to mandate a per
se exclusion of waivers made without legal counsel." Id. at 1166. The study was con-
ducted on juvenile subjects between the ages of 10 and 16 and I.Q.'s ranging from 11%
below 70 to 22% above 100. Id. at 1151 nn.77-78. The author argues that because the
children could not understand the nature and significance of the Miranda warning, they
could not have made "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary" waivers. Id. at 1160. How-
ever, there have been contrary studies which indicate that age is not a significant factor
in whether a suspect confesses. See Michael McConville & Philip Morrell, Recording the
Interrogations: Have the Police Got It Taped?, 1983 CRIi. L. REV. 158.
35. See David W. Neubauer, Confessions in Prairie City: Some Causes and Ef-
fects, 65 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103, 106 (1974) (finding that suspects interrogated
about property offenses confessed more readily than suspects interrogated about violent
offenses); Barry Mitchell, Confessions and Police Interrogation of Suspects, 1983 CRIM.
L. REv. 596, 602 (noting that some studies indicate that suspects interrogated about
sexual offenses were most likely to confess).
36. There is evidence that repeat offenders are more familiar with the probable
consequences of confession, are more likely to be informed of and assert their rights, and
because they are familiar with police tactics, they are not fooled. Thus, some studies
indicate that first offenders are more compliant at the police station than repeat offend-
ers. E.g., Neubauer, supra note 35, at 106-07. However, other studies suggest that sus-
pects with previous convictions are more likely to confess than suspects without such
experience. This finding is accounted for by the speculation that suspects who repeatedly
commit crimes may believe it is futile to resist, they have no reputation to lose, or they
may possess minimal intelligence, which makes them less able to cope with interrogatory
pressure. Mitchell, supra note 35, at 602.
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a new course for the law, it is first essential to understand the devel-
opment of the existing jurisprudence.
A. The "Voluntariness Standard"
The doctrine of voluntariness governs the admissibility of confes-
sions. Simply stated, the doctrine holds that a confession may not
be used in a court if it was extracted from a suspect involuntarily.
The source of voluntariness jurisprudence was the 1936 landmark
case Brown v. Mississippi, in which the Supreme Court turned its
attention to coercive misconduct by local police, as opposed to fed-
eral police, for the first time. 8 In Brown, a group of white police
officers had used brutal torture to extract false confessions from
three black defendants accused of murder. Two of the defendants
were whipped and beaten into compliance. When the third defendant
defiantly denied the charges, the police officers repeatedly hanged
him by a noose from a tree limb and whipped him until he, too,
inevitably confessed.39 The trial court admitted the confessions, even
though it was fully aware of the way in which the confessions had
37. Exclusionary rules governing the admissibility of confessions stem from the
rights granted criminal defendants in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to
the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment provides, "No person ... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without the due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. In cases
prior to 1964, the Court relied on the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
when deciding the propriety of a defendant's confession. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1 (1964); see infra note 43. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vides, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. The
Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
assistance of counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The United States Su-
preme Court has relied on all three constitutional provisions in determining the admissi-
bility of confessions since 1936; however, the Court varied its emphases as its approach
to coerced confessions changed over time. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 447-48 (3d ed. 1988); ISRAEL ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND
THE CONSTITUTION 257-309 (1993).
38. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). The Supreme Court's first confession cases arose from a
series of lower federal court cases. In its first confession case in 1884, the Supreme Court
adopted the English common law rule which excluded confessions that were induced by a
promise of benefit or the threat of harm. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). The ration-
ale for exclusion of such induced confessions was that they were inherently unreliable.
See generally OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT
19-26 (1973); SALTZBURG, supra note 37, at 447-48; ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 37, at
257-60.
39. Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-82.
been procured and no other evidence was offered; the Supreme Court
of Mississippi affirmed .4  The United States Supreme Court railed
that the violent tactics used by the police were "revolting to the
sense of justice" 41 and held that such physically coercive tactics were
a "clear denial of due process, ' 4 even though the Court had not yet
held that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states.43
Brown and the early confession cases established that police over-
reaching was the crucial element of involuntariness." However, the
blatant physical coercion used by police officers in Brown and in
other early cases was easy to identify. As law enforcement officials
became increasingly aware of the per se involuntariness of a confes-
sion induced by physical coercion, interrogators cleverly turned to
more subtle forms of psychological persuasion.
In Spano v. New York,45 the seminal case concerning psychologi-
cal coercion, the Supreme Court held a confession involuntary when
teams of police officers questioned the defendant for eight hours,
during which an officer who was the suspect's boyhood friend mis-
represented that the officer would lose his job if the suspect failed to
cooperate.46 The Court recognized that the more subtle behavior of
the law enforcement officials complicated the voluntariness inquiry,
but it refused to abdicate its duty to safeguard individual rights. The
40. Id. at 284-85, 287.
41. Id. at 286.
42. Id.
43. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The Supreme Court held that the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to the States. Id. at 3. In
cases prior to Malloy, the Court relied upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine the admissibility of a suspect's confession.
44. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (defendant held in-
communicado without adequate food for 16 days in closed cell without windows); Reck v.
Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (defendant held for four days without adequate food or neces-
sary medical attention until he confessed); Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)
(defendant held for five days of interrogation, during which investigators used a variety
of coercive techniques); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (defendant held incom-
municado for three days with little food; officers obtained a confession when defendant
was informed that the Chief of Police was preparing to allow a lynch mob entrance into
jail); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) (suspect held without a hearing for five days,
during which he was intermittently interrogated by detectives); Ashcraft v. Tennessee,
322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding that a presumption of coercion was created when relays of
detectives interrogated the defendant for an uninterrupted 36 hours without an opportu-
nity for sleep); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (confession procured by unrelenting
questioning, whipping, beating, and burning of the defendant was not admissible);
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (confessions obtained by threatening defend-
ants to such a degree that they feared for their lives were inadmissible). See generally Y.
KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (7th ed. 1990); JEROME H. SKOLNICK
& JAMES J. FYFE, ABOvE THE LAW, POLICE AND THE ExcESSIVE USE OF FORCE, 43-61
(1993).
45. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
46. Id. at 320, 323.
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Court maintained, "[A]s law enforcement officers become more re-
sponsible, and the methods used to extract confessions more sophisti-
cated, [the Court's] duty to enforce federal constitutional protections
does not cease. It only becomes more difficult."4
Consequently, the Spano Court expanded the traditional scope of
the voluntariness inquiry to include scrutiny of numerous other fac-
tors besides police conduct alone. In determining whether a confes-
sion was voluntary, the Spano Court considered the mental state and
intelligence of the accused, the conditions of interrogation, and
whether the suspect was denied the proper implementation of his le-
gal rights.48 Thus, in addition to the deceptive ruse employed by po-
lice, the suspect's history of emotional instability, lack of education,
and denials of his requests for counsel factored into the decision to
exclude the defendant's confession.49 Although the Spano Court
noted society's interest in "prompt and efficient law enforcement," 50
the Court emphasized that even though the conduct of the police
officers did not approach the brutal torture of past cases, it was suffi-
ciently coercive to compel an untrustworthy confession." More im-
portantly, the Court emphasized that law enforcement officials have
a burden to protect the rights of all citizens, including those accused
of a crime.52 In protecting those fundamental rights, the Court in-
sisted that "police must obey the law while enforcing the law." 53
47. Id. at 321.
48. Id. at 321-22.
49. Id. at 321-23. In ruling to exclude the defendant's confession, the Court noted:
[The Defendant] had progressed only one-half year into high school and the
record indicates that he had a history of emotional instability. . . .[Defend-
ant] was questioned for virtually eight straight hours before he confessed ....
The questioners persisted in the face of his repeated refusals to answer on the
advice of his attorney, and they ignored his reasonable requests to contact the
local attorney whom he had already retained and who had personally delivered
him into the custody of these officers in obedience to the bench warrant.
Id. at 322-23. The use of defendant's childhood friend to entreat defendant to confess
was "another factor which deserves mention in the totality of the situation." Id. at 323;
see GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 293-94; White, supra note 10, at 605-06. In addi-
tion, it appears that the denial of the suspect's request for counsel weighed heavily in the
Court's decision. This arguable shift in focus, from police conduct to whether there was a
denial of right to counsel, was foreshadowed the previous year in Crooker v. California.
357 U.S. 433 (1958) (four dissenters argued that the police had violated the defendant's
due process right to legal representation and legal advice by denying his specific request
for counsel, and that any confession obtained under these circumstances should be
barred); see ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 37, at 272.
50. Spano, 360 U.S. at 315.
51. Id. at 320-24.
52. Id. at 320.
53. Id.
After Spano, the traditional due process "voluntariness" test re-
mained viable. Nevertheless, the focus of the voluntariness inquiry
had broadened to include assessment of many factors besides police
conduct. As a result, the voluntariness inquiry into the "totality of
the circumstances" was extremely difficult for the lower courts and
law enforcement officers to apply. 4 Although the Court in Spano
had provided an illustrative list of factors to be considered under the
totality of the circumstances, the list failed to create a "single lit-
mus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation [s]."5
The weight to be given the presence or combination of any of the
Spano factors in each individual set of circumstances remained am-
biguous. Furthermore, the Court's list of relevant factors clearly was
not intended to displace the established case-by-case analysis.5 6 The
lack of objective rules gave trial judges license to "give weight to
their subjective preferences" in assessing the admissibility of confes-
sions.57 In addition, appellate courts were unable to devise an objec-
tive standard of review of the lower courts' inconsistent decisions. 8
Moreover, the ambiguity of the voluntariness jurisprudence in the
courts failed to provide specific guidance to interrogators regarding
which tactics would render a resulting confession inadmissible.
Therefore, the voluntariness test allowed law enforcement officers
wide latitude to exert psychological pressure to extract confessions;
such pressure most frequently exploited psychologically vulnerable
suspects. 59
B. Miranda: Rejection of the "Voluntariness Standard"
In the 1966 landmark case Miranda v. Arizona,60 the United
States Supreme Court observed that contemporary police interroga-
tion practices were laden with psychological coercion. In response to
54. SALTZBURG, supra note 37, at 450-51.
Because the [Supreme] Court could not possibly pass on all of the state confes-
sion cases in which review was sought, usually certiorari was limited to death
penalty cases or others of special concern. Thus, the confusion in the lower
courts was not something with which the High Court could concern itself.
Id. at 451.
55. Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
56. Spano, 360 U.S. at 323-24; see White, supra note 10, at 605-06; Beamon,
supra note 8, at 671-72 nn.17 & 20.
57. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REv. 865, 870(1981) (book review).
58. Id. In fact, it has been argued that each totality of the circumstances decision
caused a greater division among lower trial and appellate courts. SALTZBURG, supra note
37, at 451.
59. Schulhofer, supra note 57, at 871-72.
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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this widespread problem, the Court seemingly rejected the voluntari-
ness analysis and promulgated a new standard for the admissibility
of confessions, based on the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation under the Fifth Amendment.6'
The Supreme Court had originally intended to achieve two delib--
erate objectives by its decision in Miranda. First, the Court at-
tempted to provide defendants in custody the opportunity to make
informed and rational decisions about whether or not to incriminate
themselves.62 Second, with the adoption of a required advisement of
rights, the Court attempted to place greater constraints on police ac-
tivity and to deter police misconduct. 63
The Miranda Court broadly held that "the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination. 6 4 Thus, the Miranda Court extended the reach
of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination from the
61. ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 37, at 309-11. In 1966, Miranda provided an alter-
native analysis of confessions, rooted in the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination, as opposed to the due process focus of the traditional voluntariness test.
Id. By 1964, the Supreme Court had already moved away from the voluntariness stan-
dard using the Sixth Amendment in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The
Massiah Court held that any confessions extracted in post-indictment interrogations de-
liberately elicited from defendants in the absence of counsel are excluded, regardless of
the voluntariness of the confession. Id. That same year, the Court also decided that when
the crime solving process shifts from investigatory to accustory, the accused must be
allowed to consult with counsel because the adversary system has begun to operate. Esco-
bedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964). This "right to counsel" approach met with
much criticism, and certainly did not replace the due process voluntariness test, under
which a wider range of factors were relevant under the totality of the circumstances.
After Massiah and Escobedo, the Supreme Court moved the Fifth Amendment to center
stage for analysis of confessions in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). For further
elaboration, see SALTZBURG, supra note 37, at 450-51; ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 37, at
281-83. Thus, the emphasis of this Comment tends to be on the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments; however, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is still important and
figures into any constitutional analysis of police interrogation tactics.
62. See W.J. Stuntz, The American Exclusionary Rule and Defendants' Changing
Rights, 1989 CRIM. L. REV. 117, 119-28; GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 295.
63. Stuntz, supra note 62, at 120.
64. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. A distinction between conduct that departs from
Miranda's procedural safeguards and conduct that abridges a person's substantive consti-
tutional right to remain silent rather than answer incriminating questions by police has
been explored at length in Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that the
police conduct in question presented only a safeguards violation rather than a substantive
rights violation); cf. Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that re-
peated interrogation by police of suspect after he invoked his right to counsel is a viola-
tion of his substantive Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination).
courtroom to police stations.6 5
Once the Court had established the right not to incriminate one-
self in a police station, the Court sought to ensure that the right
could survive the realities of the interrogation room. To foster this
purpose, the Court ordered that all custodial interrogations be pre-
ceded by a specified advisement of rights. Miranda requires that
when a suspect is taken into custody, she must be advised that she
has a right to remain silent, that anything she says can and will be
used against her in a court, that she has the right to consult with a
lawyer and to have the lawyer present during interrogation, and that
if she cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed to represent
her.66 Furthermore, the suspect must be advised of her continuous
opportunity to exercise her rights throughout custodial
interrogation. 7
Regardless of some disapproving language the Court uses regard-
ing police trickery, Miranda stops short of interdicting the use of
trickery. The Court indicated its aversion to deceptive tactics when it
stated that "any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked,
or cajoled into a waiver will . . . show that the defendant did not
voluntarily waive his privilege."6 8 Furthermore, the Court carefully
examined and condemned a representative sample of deceptive inter-
rogation techniques. 69 Nevertheless, Miranda did not hold that any
specific tactic or trickery would render a resulting confession
involuntary.
"Miranda was viewed by many as a radical change in the law"
because it departed from and implicitly rejected the established vol-
untariness standard.7 0 Prior to the Miranda decision, the failure by
police to implement a suspect's due process rights did not guarantee
the exclusion of a subsequent confession. Because the lower courts
applied the voluntariness approach inconsistently, interrogators often
successfully gambled that questionable conduct would not result in
exclusion of a resulting confession. By creating increased and explicit
safeguards of a custodial suspect's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the Miranda Court implicitly recognized that
65. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467. The Court stated, "Today, then, there can be no
doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceed-
ings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves." Id.
66. Id. at 444.
67. Id. at 444-45.
68. Id. at 476.
69. Id. at 450-55. The Court examined the "Mutt and Jeff' routine (also known as
good cop-bad cop), the reverse line-up, and the offer of incriminating excuses for the
suspect's actions. Id.
70. SALTZBURG, supra note 37, at 481-82.
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the previous "voluntariness" standard alone did not sufficiently pro-
tect these rights. Clearly, if the existing system had provided ade-
quate protection of individual rights, an explicit advisement would
not have been necessary.
Even though the decision increased protection of suspects' rights,
there are two inherent limitations on Miranda's holding. First, Mi-
randa warnings need only be given when a suspect is in custodial
interrogation. The Court defined custodial interrogation as "ques-
tioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."7 Second, a suspect may waive her privilege
against self-incrimination. An interrogation is presumed coercive un-
less the suspect has "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waived
her constitutional rights.72 If the suspect does in fact waive her
rights, then police may permissibly use deliberate trickery and de-
ception to obtain a confession.
In subsequent years, Miranda has had only minimal effect in pro-
tecting suspects' rights.73 There are reasons for Miranda's minimal
effect. First, the Miranda warning is relevant to custodial interroga-
tion only, that is, when the subject is either under arrest or not free
to leave. Therefore, the warning need not be given to suspects who
have not been formally arrested.74 As a result, police who aim to
extract confessions have learned to "interview rather than interro-
gate.17 5 This means that police usually try to conduct a consensual
71. 384 U.S. at 444.
72. Id. Commentators have suggested that it is not possible for a criminal suspect
to "intelligently" waive his or her constitutional rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441
n.3 (quoting 40 L.A. B. BULL. 603 (1965)); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncer-
tain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances"); SKOLNICK &
FYFE, supra note 44, at 59; Fred E. Inbau, Miranda's Immunization of Low Intelligence
Offenders, 24 PROSECUTOR J. NAT'L DISTRICT ATr'Ys ASS'N 9 (1991); Thomas Grisso,
Juveniles' Capacities to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical Analysis, 68 CAL. L. REV.
1134 (1980). Studies vary regarding the actual percentage of suspects who waive their
right to silence or to have an attorney present. It appears that 80-95 % of custodial sus-
pects eventually waive their Miranda rights. See generally Skolnick & Leo, The Ethics
of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETcICS 3, 11 n.24; GUDJONSSON I, supra note
6, at 59-60.
73. Arguably, the Miranda decision has had very little effect at all, either in pro-
tecting defendants' rights or in hindering law enforcement efforts. The decision has be-
come a lightening rod of criticism and debate. See generally SALTZBURG, supra note 37,
at 483-84 and authorities cited therein.
74. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347 (1976). See generally ISRAEL ET
AL., supra note 37, at 309-11.
75. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 44, at 58.
interview with witnesses in such a way that the witness remains
physically free to leave at any time. The police must advise a witness
of his or her rights only in the event that the witness says something
that indicates involvement in the crime. Prior to that point in time,
the witness is not a suspect and need not be advised of his or her
rights.76 The practical line between a potential suspect and an actual
suspect is tenuous, but detectives have become experts at toeing that
line.
The second reason for the minimal practical effect of Miranda is
that the Miranda warning has become a mere formality.
[T]he same law enforcement community that once regarded the 1966 Mi-
randa decision as a death blow to criminal investigation has now come to
see the explanation of rights as a routine part of the process--simply a
piece of station house furniture, if not a civilizing influence on police workitself 77
Through a variety of tactics, detectives artfully de-emphasize the im-
portance of the Miranda warning, giving the suspect the impression
that the warning is a mere formality78 or a burdensome obstacle
which only hinders the detective's efforts to help the suspect.79 More-
over, once the suspect waives his or her rights and opts to cooperate
in the interrogation, she is "fair game."80 Thus, once detectives have
obtained a waiver, which appears to occur in most cases, the sus-
pect's Miranda protections no longer exist.
The third reason for Miranda's minimal effect is that subsequent
decisions have narrowed the scope of its broad holding, effectively
76. E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
77. SIMON, supra note 1, at 211.
78. Skolnick & Leo, supra note 72, at 5. Skolnick and Leo explain that:
[P]olice routinely deliver the Miranda warnings in a flat, perfunctory tone of
voice to communicate that the warnings are merely a bureaucratic ritual. Al-
though it might be inevitable that police would deliver Miranda warnings
unenthusiastically, investigators whom we have interviewed say that they con-
sciously recite the warnings in a manner intended to heighten the likelihood of
eliciting a waiver.
Id.; see also J. MACDONALD & D. MICHAUD, THE CONFESSION: INTERROGATION AND
CRIMINAL PROFILES FOR POLICE OFFICERS 17 (1987) ("Do not make a big issue of advis-
ing a suspect of his rights. Do it quickly, do it briefly, and do not repeat it."). See gener-
ally STEPHENS, JR., supra note 38 (summary of studies of the impact of Miranda in
various jurisdictions); Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967).
79. E.g., People v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1474-76, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
126, 140-41 (1993). The first officer told the suspect that by not talking it only "makes it
worse for you." Later, the second officer asked "[H]ow come you want to hang for first
degree murder?" When the suspect did not reply, the officer indicated that a conviction
for premeditated murder was certain. Then the officer said, "You can't even defend your-
self now." Later still the second officer said, "Now our job is [to] convince you that by
talking to us, you'll have a better chance all the way around to [avoid being locked up]
.... If we have to be here two days straight, we'll be here. . . .Your decision to stay
quiet [is] not the right decision." Id.
80. See Abney, supra note 20, at 118; Skolnick & Leo, supra note 72, at 4.
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crippling Miranda's original thrust.81 Subsequent cases essentially
have reverted back to the voluntariness approach, which Miranda
implicitly rejected. Most significantly, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the voluntariness standard applies to waivers of rights.82 "First,
the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the
sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception.""3 Furthermore, a defend-
ant's waiver must be made in "full awareness of both the nature of
the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it."84 Thus, the Supreme Court has not subsequently em-
braced Miranda's promise of moving away from the voluntariness
standard.85 Consequently, Miranda has had only a limited impact on
81. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (holding that self-incrimi-
nating statements made in absence of Miranda warning usable for impeachment of de-
fendant's direct testimony); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (holding that
incomplete warnings are sufficient protection); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976) (limiting "custody" for purposes of giving Miranda warnings); Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (holding that confession was admissible when elicited
without Miranda warnings because defendant voluntarily went to the police station in
response to request by police officer); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (limit-
ing "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda warnings); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984) (violation of the Miranda warning is acceptable when public safety is at
stake); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (holding that a confession cannot be
involuntary absent police coercion); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (holding
that a new version of the voluntariness standard applies to Miranda waivers); Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (second confession, extracted after Miranda warnings given,
admissible because sufficiently attenuated from previous confession obtained in violation
of Miranda). See generally Charles J. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the
Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandize Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1826 (1987); Althea Kul-
ler, Note, Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates Police Interference with the At-
torney-Client Relationship, 18 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 251 (1986); Bettie E. Goldman, Note,
Oregon v. Elstad: Boldly Stepping Backwards to Pre-Miranda Days?, 35 CATH. U. L.
REV. 245 (1985); Martin R. Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Mi-
randa Rule-A Critique, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 429 (1984).
82. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986). See generally Scott A.
McCreight, Comment, Colorado v. Connelly: Due Process Challenges to Confessions
and Evidentiary Reliability Interests, 73 IOWA L. REv. 207 (1987).
83. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986).
84. Id.
85. Furthermore, in Title II of the Crime Control Act of 1968, Congress purported
to repeal Miranda in federal prosecutions. The statute provides: "In any criminal prose-
cution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession ...
shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1988).
The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consid-
eration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, includ-
ing ... whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not
required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used
against him .... whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to
questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel .... The presence or ab-
sence of any of the above mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by
the protection of suspects' Fifth Amendment rights.8 6
C. Current Status of the Law: Return to Voluntariness
Today, all that remains of the broad agenda promulgated in Mi-
randa is the basic holding that a custodial suspect's confession is
inadmissible to establish guilt unless he has previously been advised
of, and has knowingly and intelligently waived, his rights.817 Courts
have also remained true to the holding that even if the suspect ini-
tially waives his rights, he may reinvoke them at any time.88 How-
ever, Miranda has been unmistakably weakened as the
the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
18 U.S.C. § 3501(b). Although the statute seems to overrule Miranda, it has not in fact
resulted in a federal departure from the Supreme Court decision.
The Attorney General in office when the statute was passed instructed his sub-
ordinates not to rely on it where it differed from Miranda, and, although a
later Attorney General changed this as official office policy, most U.S. Attor-
neys appear to have continued to adhere to the restrained position initially
taken.
ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 37, at 306-07. Most commentators originally thought the stat-
ute was invalid; but those who conceded that Miranda was subject to congressional re-
dress argued that Title II did nothing more than return to the pre-Miranda voluntariness
test. Id. at 307.
86. The Supreme Court has subsequently held that the harmless error rule applies
to the admission of involuntary confessions. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
In Fulminante, a confession was obtained when a prison inmate, who was also an in-
former, offered to protect Fulminante from prison violence, but only if he confessed to
the murder of his daughter. Id. at 284. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court found that the
admission of this confession was error, but merely harmless. Id. at 285. Thus, the Court
upheld the defendant's murder conviction. Previous to this decision, a resulting conviction
was automatically invalidated when a confession used as evidence against the defendant
was found to have been coerced. See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). Al-
though the harmless error issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to
note this decision and how it might dramatically weaken a suspect's Fifth Amendment
rights. Commentators suggest that the Fulminante decision foreshadows further infringe-
ment on defendants' rights, and that this case sends a message to police that they may
use threats of violence to obtain confessions. See generally Robert Paul, Comment, Ari-
zona v. Fulminante: The Application of Harmless Error Analysis to Admission of a
Coerced Confession in Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 1061 (1992); Amy B. Bloom, Note, Constitutional
Law-Harmless-Error Analysis Applies to Erroneously Admitted Coerced Confes-
sions-Arizona v. Fulminante, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 269 (1992); Jason Cenicola,
Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: Accusation or Inquisition?, 27 Naw ENG. L. REV.
383 (1992); John J. Henry, Note, Criminal Procedure -Application of the Harmless
Error Rule to Miranda Violations, 14 W. NEw EN;. L. REV. 109 (1992); Karina Perga-
ment, Comment, Arizona v. Fulminante: Romancing Coerced Confessions, 69 DENy. U,
L. REV. 153 (1992); Joan M. Galli, Note, Arizona v. Fulminante: Paving the Way for
the "Harmless" Coerced Confession, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 409 (1992).
87. E.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); People v. Boyer, 48 Cal. 3d 247,
271, 768 P.2d 610, 622, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 108 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 975
(1989). However, statements obtained absent notification of these rights may still be used
to impeach the credibility of the defendant if he testifies. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971).
88. E.g., People v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1480-81, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
126, 144 (1993).
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jurisprudential view of the criminal justice sytem has shifted away
from a due process orientation to a crime control orientation. 9 Even
though Miranda implicitly rejected the voluntariness standard as in-
sufficient to protect the constitutional rights of suspects, the Supreme
Court has since resurrected it. The voluntariness test currently ap-
plies to waivers of rights and confessions.
Thus, modern confession law is currently almost as ambiguous as
the era before Miranda. To determine whether admissions or state-
ments are involuntary, the "totality of the circumstances" test has
survived to become the established rule. The list of relevant factors
has expanded since the inception of the approach in Spano v. New
York. An inquiry into the totality of the circumstances includes,
among other factors, examination of the age of the accused, the sus-
pect's intelligence or education level, the suspect's mental state at
the time of confession, the site of the interrogation, the implementa-
tion of the suspect's legal rights, whether the investigation has fo-
cused on the suspect, the length and form of the questioning, and the
absence or use of psychological or physical coercion.90
The presence of coercive police tactics is not dispositive to the vol-
untariness inquiry, but the absence of police misconduct is disposi-
tive. In other words, coercive police activity is a necessary predicate
to finding that a waiver or confession is involuntary. Regardless of
the suspect's mental state or capacity, his or her self-incriminating
statements can be admitted without violation of the due process
clause if the court finds that the police conducted themselves prop-
erly. 1 The Supreme Court maintains that:
as interrogators have turned to more subtle forms of psychological persua-
sion, courts have found the mental condition of the defendant a more signif-
icant factor in the "voluntariness" calculus .... But this fact does notjustify a conclusion that a defendant's mental condition, by itself and apart
89. David M. O'Brien, Thinking About Crime: High Court Changes Course, PUB.
PERSP., July-Aug. 1991, at 6.
90. United States v. Montgomery, 14 F.3d 1189, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1994); People
v. Shawn D., 20 Cal. App. 4th 200, 208-10, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 400-01 (1993); People
v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1484-85, 1485 n.20, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 147-48
(1993).
91. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163 (1986). The Supreme Court main-
tained in Connelly:
[T]he Constitution rightly leaves this sort of inquiry to be resolved by state
laws governing the admission of evidence and erects no standard of its own in
this area. A statement rendered by [a mentally ill defendant] might be proved
to be quite unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary
laws of the forum, .... and not by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id. at 167.
from its relation to official coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into
constitutional "voluntariness."
92
Thus, the mental capacity of the suspect is one factor, but not a sole
determinant, in considering the "totality of the circumstances."
The use of police trickery is a relevant factor to a voluntariness
inquiry under the "totality of the circumstances" test, but trickery
alone will not render a resulting statement involuntary.93 When the
relevant factors under the "totality of the circumstances" test are
assessed, courts generally exclude only those confessions procured by
egregious tactics that would coerce an "innocent person [to] con-
fess."94 Therefore, it is settled that police may not use force, threats
of force, and explicit promises of immunity or reward, because such
tactics would coerce an innocent person to confess. 5 Moreover, fla-
grant ploys, like having a detective pose as a priest or a defense law-
yer to get a confession, are regarded as unacceptably coercive.
Nonetheless, in the vast majority of cases when the conduct in ques-
tion is substantially more subtle, these few established rules do not
provide clear guidance. Under the current body of law, it is up to the
discretion of judges to decide in individual cases if police tactics
were appropriate, considering both the conduct of police and charac-
teristics of the accused. The majority of courts also require confes-
sions to be corroborated by evidence from an independent source as
a judicial safeguard against untrustworthy admissions.9"
The sentiments of law enforcement officers confirm that today's
"totality of the circumstances" approach gives interrogators wide
latitude. According to law enforcement officers who are trained in
the techniques espoused by current manuals, it is currently abso-
lutely legal, as well as indispensible, to use deception in interroga-
tion. According to Greg McCreary, an FBI agent and an instructor
at the agency's academy in Quantico, Virginia, "'[lIegally, it's OK
92. Id. at 164.
93. E.g., People v. Arguello, 65 Cal. 2d 768, 775, 423 P.2d 202, 56 Cal. Rptr. 274
(1967); People v. Atchley, 53 Cal. 2d 160, 171, 346 P.2d 764 (1959).
94. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 217.
95. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897).
96. JOHNSON, supra note 8, at 355-59. However, one commentator has argued that
the corroboration rule is insufficient to protect the reliability of a confession. Corey J.
Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Safe-
guards Against False Confessions, 1984 Wis. L. Rav. 1121. The commentator argues
that there are three major problems with the corroboration rule: (1) The police can sug-
gest corroborating evidence to the suspect which subsequently becomes incorporated into
the suspect's confession; (2) The corroboration rule does not protect those who overstate
their involvement in a crime; (3) Juries and judges are not able to evaluate independent
evidence once they have heard the suspect's confession. Id. at 1186-89. For further criti-
cism of this rule of independent corroboration, see generally Thomas A. Mullen, Rule
Without Reason: Requiring Independent Proof of the Corpus Delicti as a Condition of
Admitting an Extrajudicial Confession, 27 U.S.F. L. REv. 385 (1993).
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to trick somebody about the status of the investigation and the evi-
dence you have. It's not like Perry Mason where a guy gets up on
the witness stand and blurts out a confession.' "I" As expressed by
Louis Campanozzi, a retired New York police detective who teaches
interrogation methods to police across the country, "'It's totally le-
gal to use deception.' "91 Lieutenant Tom Thompson of the Hender-
son, Nevada Police Department explains that it is the policy of his
department that an investigating officer must not use "outright de-
ception" such as falsified evidence or false claims that evidence of
the suspect's guilt exists.99 However, "psychology and body lan-
guage"'100 are necessary because a defendant will not confess without
some encouragement. Lieutenant Thompson admits that it is very
difficult to lay out "hard and fast rules of conduct"'' 1 in this area,
and that ultimately, it is "up to the integrity of the officer"'' 2 to
conduct himself properly.
In summary, police are not currently prohibited from using trick-
ery and deceptive psychological tactics to elicit self-incriminating
statements from a suspect. But whether police should be prohibited
from using trickery and deception is an entirely different matter.
V. SHOULD POLICE BE ALLOWED To USE TRICKERY?
A. Effective Law Enforcement
One argument in favor of allowing police to use trickery and de-
ception to elicit confessions from suspects in interrogation is that
such psychological persuasion is justified for purposes of effective law
enforcement, crime control, and public safety.103 Fred Inbau and his
associates, the preeminent advocates of the official use of deceitful
interrogation practices, defend such practices as completely proper.
97. Steve Jensen, Police Using Deceit to Get Confessions, Psychological Tricks
Challenged in Court; Police Use Psychological Tactics to Get Suspects to Confess,
HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 16, 1992, at B1 (quoting Greg McCreary).
98. Id.
99. Telephone Interview with Lieutenant Tom Thompson of the Henderson, Ne-




103. See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). See generally Brian C.
Jayne & Joseph P. Buckley, Criminal Interrogation Techniques on Trial, 25 PROSECU-
TOR J. NAT'L DISTRICT ATT'ys Ass'N 23 (1991); STEPHENS, JR., supra note 38, at 90;
INBAU ET AL., supra note 2.
Inbau and his associates argue that interrogation tactics are im-
proper only when (1) the tactic would induce an innocent person to
confess, or (2) a confession is obtained in violation of a judicial rule
designed to safeguard a constitutional right.1 04 In the first category,
tactics which would induce an innocent person to confess include
physical force, threats of physical injury, or explicit promises of leni-
ency in return for a confession.105 Under the second category, it
would be improper to obtain a confession in the absence of Miranda
warnings.1"6 Crime control advocates argue that, as long as police
conduct falls outside of these two categories of proscribed behavior,
the conduct is proper. According to this rationale, psychologically
sophisticated interrogation techniques are proper because, while they
are certainly effective enough to elicit confessions from guilty sus-
pects, they would not cause an innocent person to confess.107 In addi-
tion, as long as officers advise a suspect of his or her rights and
subsequently obtain a proper waiver, any interrogation tactics used
to elicit a confession would not violate a judicial rule designed to
safeguard a constitutional right.
Second, police and prosecutors argue that deceptive police interro-
gation tactics are not only proper, they are essential.10 The United
States Supreme Court has conceded that the creation of a "favorable
climate for confession" 109 is generally necessary because "very few
people give incriminating statements in the absence of official action
of some kind." °10 Despite the Supreme Court's concession regarding
the use of some official coercion, crime control advocates complain
104. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 217; Jayne & Buckley, supra note 103, at 23.
105. Jayne & Buckley, supra note 103, at 23. See generally FRED E INBAu. LiE-
DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (1942).
106. Jayne & Buckley, supra note 103, at 23. Jayne and Buckley argue that none
of the interrogation tactics they consider proper involves continuing a custodial interroga-
tion after the suspect has invoked his Miranda rights. "Nor do we advocate preventing a
suspect from leaving the room. On the other hand, if the suspect has made no attempt to
terminate the interrogation, he cannot legitimately claim that his confession was com-
pelled." Id. at 30.
107. Id. at 28-29. Jayne and Buckley argue that the concept of "psychological
coercion" does not exist. The authors refer to Webster's dictionary as proof that coercion
means "to constrain or force to do something; to bring under control by force." As these
authors argue, coercion necessarily involves the use of physical force, or a threat of phys-
ical force which constrains the suspect. The authors concede that practices such as "per-
suasion, deception, propaganda, and positive and negative reinforcements ...may
influence behavior, beliefs, and expectancies; but they certainly do not force or constrain
the suspect in any way." Id. at 29. Thus, the authors argue, because psychological tactics
do not involve causing, or threatening to cause, physical harm to the suspect, such tech-
niques are entirely proper.
108. See Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation - A Practical Necessity, 52 J. CRIM.
L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 412 (1961); STEPHENS, JR., supra note 38.
109., Hawkins v. Lynaugh, 844 F.2d 1132, 1140 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 900 (1988).
110. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973).
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that many judges do not comprehend the extent to which psychologi-
cal tactics are absolutely essential to elicit confessions."' As Profes-
sor of Law Joseph D. Grano explains, "The professional interrogator,
with his anxiety-inducing tactics, is employed precisely because the
inherent pressures of custodial interrogation usually are insufficient
by themselves to produce the desired confession.""'
In sum, crime control advocates emphatically argue that psycho-
logical persuasion is indispensible because suspects have very little
incentive to confess without such prompting.113 Furthermore, there is
no question that the use of trickery and deception provides a highly
effective means of extracting confessions; and given the important
role of confessions in law enforcement, police must be free to employ
effective means of obtaining them. Thus, police deceit is justified as
a necessary and proper means of ensuring effective law enforcement
and crime control. Moreover, police are confident that each individ-
ual officer's careful avoidance of false admissions will provide suffi-
cient safeguards against that danger.
B. False Confessions
Members of the staff of John E. Reid and Associates, a firm that
specializes in criminal interrogation, advocate that a detective may
distinguish permissible interrogation tactics from impermissible in-
terrogation practices by asking herself the following: "Is what I am
about to do, or say, apt to make an innocent person confess?""14
They insist that a detective who poses this question to herself and
answers in the negative may confidently and properly proceed, with-
out danger of false confession:
[T]o elicit a confession from a guilty suspect, .. the interrogator must be
allowed to use techniques which effectively decrease the suspect's resistance
to confess, while at the same time increasing a desire to tell the truth ....
Out of necessity, these techniques are psychologically sophisticated. They
involve persuasion, insincerity, and potential trickery and deceit .... But
they do not involve coercion, [or] compulsion, .... and they do not remove
I11. Jayne & Buckley, supra note 103, at 24.
112. Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Inter-
rogator and Modern Criminal Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 662, 674-75 (1986) (book review).
113. See GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 72. Dr. Gudjonsson explains that there
are a number of factors which inhibit people from confessing to crimes they have com-
mitted. Some of the most important inhibitors are (1) fear of legal sanctions, (2) concern
about one's reputation, (3) not wanting to admit to oneself what one has done, (4) not
wanting one's family and friends to know about the crime, and (5) fear of retaliation.
Furthermore, the more reprehensible the offense, the more the suspect is likely to deny
culpability. Id.
114. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 217.
a suspect's free will ...
Most assuredly, none of the techniques or tactics presented here would
cause an innocent person to confess a crime.
110
Even without a law enforcement background, a skeptical layperson
probably could not fathom how or why an innocent person would
confess to any crime, let alone a capital offense. Thus, the logical
skeptic concludes that either the alleged false confessors are guilty
indeed, or are so few and far between that they are not a legitimate
concern.
To the contrary, numerous studies show that false confessions do
occur as a result of the psychologically persuasive tactics taught by
police manuals and practiced by police.11 In fact, an influential
1986 study of wrongful conviction felony cases estimated that there
are nearly 6,000 false confessions annually in the United States.,
17
Another important study in 1987 identified false confessions as the
leading source of wrongful convictions of innocent persons. 118 Thus,
contrary to both the intuitive reaction of skeptics and the bold assur-
ances of crime control advocates, false confessions do occur, and not
merely as a result of physical coercion.
According to one researcher, "over-zealousness" on the part of po-
lice interrogators constitutes the single most common cause of false
115. Jayne & Buckley, supra note 103, at 31. The authors offer no empirical proof
of their broad assurance that the psychological persuasion would not cause an innocent
person to confess. Apparently, the statement rests on intuition alone.
116. See K.S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Pun-
ishment, and Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 59 (1984); K.S. Bordens & J. Bassett, The Plea Bargaining Processfrom
the Defendant's Perspective: A Field Investigation, 6 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
93 (1985); Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Confession Evidence, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds.,
1985); Kassin & McNall, supra note 18.
117. Huff et al., Guilty Until Proven Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public
Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518-44 (1986); see also Rattner, Convicted But Innocent:
Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal Justice System, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 283-93
(1987); E.D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (1964); FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957);
E.M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: ERRORS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1932). In
a study of wrongful convictions in Great Britian, Ruth Brandon and Christie Davies
studied 70 British cases of wrongful imprisonment, in which the defendants were subse-
quently considered innocent of the crime for which they were convicted. The authors
found that, after mistaken identification, self incriminating confessions were the most
common cause of wrongful imprisonment in Great Britain. RUTH BRANDON & CHRISTIE
DAVIES. WRONGFUL IMPRISONMENT (1973).
118. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21 (1987). For criticism of the 1987 Bedau & Radelet
study, see Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response
to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988). Markman and Cassell con-
tend that the Bedau-Radelet study is severely flawed and that the study actually confirms
that the risk of executing the innocent is too small to be a significant factor in the debate
over the death penalty.
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confessions. 119 Because detectives are trained to presume a suspect is
guilty from the outset of the interrogation, 120 it may take "several
hours, in order to definitely eliminate innocent suspects ....
Therefore, it might be very difficult for an innocent suspect to vindi-
cate him or herself in the eyes of interrogators. "[I]n the interroga-
tion room the suspect has an opportunity to disclose information or
evidence that may establish positive proof of innocence. Upon many
occasions this may be the only way he can be removed from further
suspicion by police.1122 But what of the unfortunate innocent suspect
who can offer no such positive proof of innocence? Under this type
of prolonged pressure, experts say that it is possible for even an inno-
cent person to become gradually convinced that cooperation provides
his or her only way out.123 In this context, a false confession can be
viewed as a normal reaction to unusual circumstances.1 24
119. L. KENNEDY, FOREWORD IN KILLING TIME 6-8 (1986). Another possible rea-
son why suspects falsely confess is to protect a close friend, a peer, or a relative from
being prosecuted. Gudjonsson & MacKeith, The Psychology of False Confessions, 142
NEW L.J. 1277 (1992). In addition, voluntary confessions occur without any external
pressure from the police. This variety of false confessor goes voluntarily to the police
station to confess to a crime. Often, he or she read about the crime in the newspaper, or
saw it on television. Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 116. Kassin and Wrightsman give
three reasons why people voluntarily give a false confession. The most important reason
is a "morbid desire for notoriety." Id. at 76. The second reason is the person's "uncon-
scious need to expiate guilt over previous transgressions via self-punishment." Id. at 77.
The third main reason why people give a voluntary false confession is that some people
are unable to distinguish fact from fantasy. Id.
120. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 2; SAMUEL R. GERBER & OLIVER SCHROEDER,
JR.. CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION (1972); CHARLES E. O'HARA, FUN-
DAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (4th ed. 1978); F. ROYAL & SCHUTT, THE
GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (1976); C. VAN METER, PRINCI-
PLES OF POLICE INTERROGATION (1973); SALTZBURG, supra note 37.
121. Jayne & Buckley, supra note 103, at 24.
122. Id. at 25.
123. See Gudjonsson & MacKeith, supra note 119; GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6,
at 223-28. The most common reasons why innocent people confess include: the suspect
was influenced by police pressure and persuasion; the suspect felt it was futile to deny the
allegations because it would be her word against the police; the suspect wanted to avoid
being taken into custody; the suspect thought he or she might get a heavier sentence if he
or she pleaded not guilty. GUDJONSSON I, supra note 6, at 223 (citing S. Dell, Silent in
Court, Occasional Papers on Social Administration, No. 42, The Social Administration
Trust: London (ISBN 07135 15767 (1971))).
124. HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND; ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY
AND CRIME (1908). Munsterberg was the first psychologist to write on the topic of false
confession. He theorized that a false confession can be elicited when shock paralyzes or
distorts the suspect's memory during interrogation. Id. For a disturbing case of a defend-
ant who was convicted of murdering her daughter after she made three self-incriminating
statements to interrogators, see Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1993). The
suspect denied killing her daughter, and agreed to take a polygraph test to prove her
innocence. Her test results indicated deception. Id. at 331-32. After viewing the tests, the
Studies show that people of normal intelligence have had this re-
action to the pressure of interrogation and have falsely confessed to
serious crimes.125 However, the majority of suspects who make false
confessions are unusually psychologically vulnerable. Three main
types of psychological vulnerabilities may cause an innocent person
to confess to a crime he or she did not commit. First, the suspect
may suffer from a mental disorder, which might substantially impair
his or her ability to make a rational decision. 26 Second, the suspect
might not suffer from a mental disorder, but is nonetheless "in an
abnormal mental state, due to such factors as severe anxiety, a pho-
bic reaction to the confinement, bereavement, or drug withdrawal"
which may affect his or her perception or judgment. 27 Third, the
suspect may be particularly prone to suggestibility, compliance, and
an inability to handle pressure."28
There have been numerous cases which suggest that suspects of
low intelligence might be unusually prone to compliance. 12 Fred In-
bau, the leading advocate of deceptive police tactics as a necessity,
has conceded that "special protection must be afforded to juveniles
and to all other persons of below-average intelligence, to minimize
the risk of obtaining untruthful admissions due to their vulnerability
to suggestive questioning."' 30 Persons of minimal intelligence are
interrogating officer told the suspect "that she had lied and that she was responsible for
[her daughter's] death." Id. at 332. The suspect was interrogated for several hours, dur-
ing which interrogators insisted on her guilt.
Throughout these interviews, Jenner continually expressed a desire to cooperate
in the investigation by getting to the bottom of her adverse polygraph test re-
sults. She told [the interrogating officer], "I'm not lying and know I didn't do
this, but maybe I psyched out in the night and don't remember it."
Id. The suspect "repeatedly offered to undergo hypnosis, psychological interviews, or any
other method that might reveal whether she had killed [her daughter]. She told [an
officer] she wanted him to be 'the vehicle to jar her memory.'" Id.
125. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson & James A.C. MacKeith, A Proven Case of False
Confession: Psychological Aspects of the Coerced-Complaint Type, 30 MED. SCI. & L.
329 (1990); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Suggestibility and Compliance Among Alleged False
Confessors and Resisters in Criminal Trial, 31 MED. SCl. & L. 147 (1991).
126. Gudjonsson & Mackeith, supra note 125, at 1278.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. E.g., Johnson v. Trigg, 28 F.3d 639, 640 (7th Cir. 1994); State v. Davis, 637
So. 2d 1012, 1029 (La. 1994); Ex Parte Lucas, 877 S.W.2d 315, 317 (Tex. Crim. App.
1994); Commonwealth v. Duffy, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 938, 629 N.E.2d 1347, 1348
(1994); State v. Van Winkle, 635 So.2d 1177, 1189 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Balew v. State,
872 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Cleary, 641 A.2d 102, 108-09 (Vt.
1994); People v. Gordon, 247 Ill. App. 3d 891, 904, 617 N.E.2d 453, 463 (1993); Simp-
son v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 557, 563, 318 S.E.2d 386, 390 (1984); Finchum v. State,
463 N.E.2d 304, 308-09 (Ind. 1984); United States v. Barnes, 520 F. Supp. 946, 952
(D.C. 1981); People v. Samuel, 29 Cal. 3d 489, 504, 629 P.2d 485, 492, 174 Cal. Rptr.
684, 691 (1981); Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 742 (1966).
130. Inbau, supra note 72, at 10. Inbau's article responded to a case in Illinois in
which the court held inadmissible the burglary confession of a 17-year-old, ninth grade
school drop out with an I.Q. of 80 because he was incapable of making a "knowing and
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often more prone to obey authority figures than persons of higher
intelligence. 13 1 Because interrogation substantially depends on the
enormous power differential between the suspect and the police of-
ficers, the grave danger for innocent suspects of low intelligence is
that they might be particularly susceptible to make incriminating
statements due to the pressures of interrogation.
At a time when states are invoking the death penalty, the problem
of false confessions is particularly horrifying." 2 As the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote in 1972 when the Supreme Court struck
down the death penalty as it was then configured, "Death is irrevo-
cable; life imprisonment is not.' 3 3 Of course, police should be con-
cerned with the potentially disastrous effects that psychological
persuasion may have on an innocent individual. However, the inno-
cent defendant is not the only victim when police use tactics which
extract false confessions. We are all at risk because a guilty criminal
remains free in the innocent confessor's stead.
C. Fairness
Although the unreliability of coerced confessions constitutes an
important concern of the justice system, the constitutional principle
which dictates exclusion of such confessions is rooted in fairness,
which stems from the due process clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 34 The Supreme Court has long subscribed to
the policy that coercive techniques should not be countenanced by a
civilized society, regardless of the importance or reliability of the in-
formation they may produce. Thus, the Court has established that
intelligent" waiver of his Miranda rights. People v. Bernasco, 138 III. 2d 349, 562
N.E.2d 958 (1990). The thrust of Inbau's article was that, although society must protect
low intelligence offenders, society cannot afford to foreclose completely the opportunity to
make any inquiries of such persons who are suspected of crime.
131. See Tom Condon, Try Again to Understand the Lapointe Tale, HARTFORD
COURANT, July 12, 1992, at BI; STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: EX-
PERIMENTAL VIEW (1974); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBE-
DIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND REPSONSIBILITY (1989);
Gudjonsson & MacKeith, supra note 125; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 n.24
(1966).
132. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 118. Bedau and Radelet presented 350
cases in which a defendant who was subsequently proven innocent had been wrongfully
convicted of a capital or potentially capital offense. Of the 350 sample cases, the authors
reported that 139 were sentenced to death and 23 were executed before their innocence
was established. Id. at 36.
133. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 346 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
134. See supra note 37 for text of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See generally ISRAEL ET AL., supra note 37, at 257-60.
the overriding value of due process is fairness, not truth. "The aim of
the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false
evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence, whether true or false.' 1 3 5 Hence, the Court has said that re-
gardless of the reliability of a confession, evidence should be
excluded if it was gathered by police methods that "shock the con-
science" of the community or violate a fundamental standard of
fairness. 3 "
Following this logic, confessions extracted by means of trickery or
deception should be excluded, regardless of the truth or falsity of the
confession, because deceptive tactics are fundamentally unfair. The
game analogy is often used to describe our system of adversarial jus-
tice. We pit the defendant against the State and provide the contes-
tants with an impartial fact-finder, the "referee." The concern for
fairness in this setting stems from a deep rooted American cultural
philosophy: "The point of the agonistic ideal is that a game is
neither interesting nor fair when it is structured so as to produce
mismatches. 1 37 The recognized price of the American adversarial
philosophy is that the guilty may infrequently prevail when the State
is penalized for its failure to play by the rules. However, "there is
nothing new in the realization that the Constitution sometimes insu-
lates the criminality of the few in order to protect the privacy of us
all."1138
In the confessions context, the police officers are the instruments
of the State. Accordingly, they must uphold the fundamental fair-
ness of our system. Interrogation constitutes an inherently unfair
"mismatch." Nevertheless, because interrogation serves indispensible
crime solving functions, we afford law enforcement agents the advan-
tage. However, the use of trickery and deception by police to obtain
confessions impermissibly infringes on established principles of fun-
damental fairness. The police are provided with an arsenal of decep-
tive interrogation tadtics, while many suspects are ill-equipped to
make rational or informed choices about whether to exercise their
rights. In order to preserve the underlying policies of the Fifth,
135. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); see, e.g., Rochin v. Califor-
nia, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (even if admission independently established as true,
"[c]oerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency"). See gen-
erally Monrad G. Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN.
L. REV. 411 (1954) (fundamental fairness is essential to our system of justice); Barbara
Allen Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982) (discussion of role of fairness in the accusatorial
system); C. WHITEBREAD. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.01 (1980).
136. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1944).
137. Babcock, supra note 135, at 1142. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The
Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for the Truth? A Progress Report, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1990).
138. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987).
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Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to maintain fairness in the crim-
inal adversary system and to check the inherent power advantage of
the state, trickery and deception should be excised from the law en-
forcement arsenal.
D. Deterrence of Police Misconduct
The Supreme Court long ago stressed the important societal need
to deter illegal police conduct. In Weeks v. United States,"3 9 the
Court first recognized that the only effective way to deter police mis-
conduct is to exclude tainted evidence.140 Forty years later, the
Spano Court said "life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves. 14 1 Thus, courts exclude confessions
resulting from police misconduct to enforce a crucial tenet of our
justice system: "the police must obey the law while enforcing the
law."14 The police use of trickery in interrogation runs afoul of this
basic rule.
Courts have attempted to deter police misconduct by reversing
convictions and excluding confessions. For example, in People v. Es-
queda,1 43 a recent noteworthy California case, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal reversed a murder conviction due to police miscon-
duct. The trial court had admitted incriminating statements made by
the defendant, who was twenty-nine years old and had seven years of
education. 4 He was subsequently convicted of the murder of his
live-in girlfriend.145 The officers obtained the admissions during an
eight hour interrogation on the night of the killing. The detectives
warned the suspect of his constitutional rights long after the defend-
ant was considered a custodial suspect.1 46 Once the officers had ad-
ministered the warning, they persuaded the suspect that exercising
his rights would jeopardize his best interests.1 4' The officers also lied
extensively to the suspect about the evidence collected against
him, 48 and convinced him that they were undeterrably confident of
139. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
140. Id. at 393-94.
141. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320-21 (1959).
142. Id. at 320.
143. 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126 (1993).
144. Id. at 1465, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 134-35.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1482-83, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 145-46.
147. Id. at 1476, 1486, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141, 148.
148. See supra note 24 for illustrative list of lies the police told Esqueda.
his guilt. Furthermore, the detectives employed a variation of the
good cop-bad cop routine, offered excuses, false sympathy, and mini-
mized the seriousness of the charges. In addition, the officers ap-
pealed to Esqueda's religious'49 and ethnic background, pleaded with
God, and spoke to Esqueda in Spanish. Finally, after six hours of
denials, the officers strategically intimated that a premeditated mur-
der conviction was certain unless Esqueda cooperated.150 Ostensibly
to help Esqueda avoid the certainty of a first degree murder convic-
tion, the detectives suggested equally incriminating alternatives to
the story Esqueda told, one of which appeared deceptively preferable
to Esqueda.151 Esqueda eventually adopted the detectives' suggested
version of the facts. 52 These taped admissions formed the heart of
the prosecution's case.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the defendant's
murder conviction, holding that these tactics amounted to a
"flagrant violation" of Esqueda's Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due pro-
cess.15 3 The court reasoned,
Once a defendant has waived his or her right of silence, the police have
some latitude to interrogate with other than Chesterfeldian politeness.
Where, however, the waiver is defective, the defendant has indicated a de-
sire for silence, and the police have taken advantage of his exhaustion, emo-
tions, and minimal education, and have used lies and threats to achieve
149. For an argument that confessions induced by appeals to religion are constitu-
tional, see Richard E. Durfee, Jr., The Constitutional Admissibility of Confessions In-
duced by Appeals to Religious Belief, 4 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 219 (1990).
150. As the officers explained, Esqueda could "go all the way up to state prison
saying, 'I didn't do it.'" 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1476, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141. Then the
officers proceeded to suggest that "[t]here's a big difference between premeditated plan-
ning and accidental, man ... you've got to tell me that it was an accident and not
premeditated." Id. at 1477, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 142. In response, Esqueda said, "It was
an accident but I didn't do it." Id. From this first incriminating statement, the detectives
slowly extracted numerous admissions from Esqueda under the pretext that such cooper-
ation would ultimately serve his best interests. Id. at 1473-77, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-
44. In obtaining the admissions, the detectives used almost all the techniques in Inbau,
Reid, and Buckley's nine-step plan. See supra note 17.
151. 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1474, 1485-86, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140, 147-48.
152. Id. at 1486, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148.
153. Id. at 1455, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 128.
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their result, we do not hesitate to declare such an interrogation violative of
the fundamental constitutional protections guaranteed each citizen by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 154
The court marveled that the misconduct of the police was "so remi-
niscent of the police conduct in the late 1950's that led the United
States Supreme Court in Spano v. New York to strike down a con-
fession as to cause wonder that we have come so far since then, yet
progressed so little.' 55
In Florida v. Cayward,151 the District Court of Appeal of Florida
excluded a confession that was induced by police trickery. In
Cayward, the defendant was suspected of sexual assault and
smothering of a child.157 Although they suspected the defendant, the
police thought they had insufficient evidence with which to charge
him . 58 Consequently, the police officers fabricated laboratory re-
ports, indicating that semen stains on the victim's underwear came
from the defendant. 59 When the false reports were exhibited to the
defendant, he indicated his involvement.' 60 The court held that the
resulting confession was involuntary because the presentation of false
scientific documents overstepped the line of permitted police decep-
tion. 61 Although the decision was grounded in the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, the court expressed important practical reasons
for its decision. First, the court feared that falsified documents might
taint the entire criminal justice system because of their "potential of
indefinite life and the facial appearance of authenticity."'6 2 The
court feared that "[a] report falsified for interrogation purposes
might well be retained and filed in police paperwork. Such reports
154. Id. at 1487, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 148. The court notes that regulation of police
misconduct does not mean that police need to purge the interrogation process of all in-
herent pressure. Some pressure in interrogation is, of course, necessary to achieve the
desired result. Opponents of the prohibition of police trickery argue that without trickery,
police would be left with pleasantries alone (i.e., "Chesterfeldian politeness") to extract
confessions. However, such dramatic predictions do not alter the principle that police
behavior must not go unregulated. The Constitution guarantees every individual certain
rights; police trickery that infringes on those rights is improper under the Constitution.
Surely, police could find ways to interrogate suspects within the bounds of the
Constitution.
155. Id. at 1484-85, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 147 (citation omitted).
156. 552 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).




161. Id. at 975.
162. Id. at 974.
have the potential of finding their way into the courtroom. 16 3 The
court worried that if falsified documents were ultimately admitted
into evidence, police would have little disincentive to falsify other
official documents "including warrants, orders, and judgments." '
This rationale extends to all forms of police trickery and deception,
not just the falsification of documents. "When police are permitted
to lie in the interrogation context, why should they refrain from ly-
ing to judges when applying for warrants, violating internal police
organization rules against lying, or lying in the courtroom?"16 5
Furthermore, the Cayward court reasoned that when police are
allowed to lie in the name of justice, public confidence in the integ-
rity of law enforcement is undermined. 6 The court explained,
[Public confidence] has been earned over the course of several decades by
increased professionalism of law enforcement agencies, education, and com-
munity involvement. We recognize that law enforcement officers must be
allowed a degree of latitude in interrogating suspects, and we acknowledge
the role of confessions in the administration of the criminal justice system.
We must, however, decline to undermine the rapport the police have devel-
oped with the public by approving participation of law enforcement officers
in practices which most citizens would consider highly inappropriate. We
think that for us to sanction the manufacturing of false documents by the
police would greatly lessen the respect the public has for the criminal jus-
tice system and for those sworn to uphold and enforce the law. In a word, in
administration of the criminal law, we simply cannot allow the end of secur-
ing a confession to justify the means employed in this case.16 7
Public confidence in law enforcement is especially relevant in to-
day's tense social climate. Scholars have suggested that trust in law
enforcement has recently hit an all-time low.1 8 The videotaped beat-
ing of Rodney King was viewed by virtually every household across
America,16 9 the fierce explosion of the Los Angeles riots underlined
163. Id. The court listed several factors which make such a possibility realistic:
First, police departments are involved in thousands of investigations each year.
Second, many of these investigations result in criminal trials which swell the
already staggering caseloads of the criminal justice system. Third, we must
consider the long periods of time which often elapse between an investigation
and the trial. During this time, those officials involved in the manufacturing of
false reports could leave for other jobs, die, or simply forget the circumstances
under which the reports were obtained.
Id.
164. Id. at 975.
165. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 44, at 62.
166. Cayward, 552 So. 2d at 975.
167. Id.
168. See generally ROBERT COULSON, POLICE UNDER PRESSURE: RESOLVING Dis-
PUTES 1 (1993). "Police officers say that they are caught between their difficult, hazard-
ous work and a hostile community, and this book supports that assertion." ANDREW J.
GOLDSMITH, COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE: THE TREND TO EXTERNAL REVIEW
(1991) (advocating the need for enhanced police accountability and recommending an
expansive procedure of external civilian complaint).
169. See, e.g., Jerome H. Skolnick, Perspective on the King Case: Dubious Rea-
soning, a Fair Sentence; Judge Davies' Perspective of Justifiable Blows Is Arguable.
Still, Even One Year in Prison Is Tough Punishment for a Cop, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5,
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law enforcement's inability to contain boiling urban angst,'17 0 and
rapper Ice-T recently made headlines with his anti-police song "Cop
Killer.'' In response, "'[c]ommunity-oriented policing' is being
implemented in a number of American police departments to im-
prove trust and citizen cooperation by changing the attitudes of both
police and public.' ' 7 2 Thus, the current social climate of urban
America makes it more important than ever for law enforcement of-
ficials to reclaim and maintain the public confidence. The police use
of trickery and deception in interrogation might have consequences
which extend beyond the individual suspect. When the public's re-
spect for law enforcement and the judicial system is undermined,
individuals might be less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement
efforts. Therefore, as the Esqueda and Cayward decisions illustrate,
both constitutional and practical concerns mandate the prohibition of
police trickery.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Almost thirty years ago, the Warren Court (1953-1969) evinced
the clear objective of safeguarding the constitutional rights of the
1993, at B7; The King Verdicts, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 18, 1993, at A8; Richard
A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson, All 4 in King Beating Acquitted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1992, at Al. For an account of the March 3, 1991 incident between the four Los Angeles
police officers and Rodney King from the perspective of one of the officers, see SOT.
STACEY C. KOON, PRESUMED GUILTY: THE TRAGEDY OF THE RODNEY KING AFFAIR
(1992).
170. "The riots that followed the Rodney King verdict show how much anger and
chaos is lurking under the surface of urban America. The police provide a primary layer
of protection from the horror of unrestrained vandalism and violence. Can we afford to
be without strong, effective police protection?" COULSON, supra note 168, at 2. See gen-
erally, A Time to Heal but Violence Is Never Cause for Celebration, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 1993, at B14; Christopher Quinn & Sharon McBreen, Citi-
zens Keep Tabs on Officers' Actions; the Review Boards for Orlando, Orange, and Semi-
nole Look at Complaints About Law Enforcement, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 1, 1993,
at BI; Bill Wallace, Law Enforcement Trend: Civilians Keeping Watch Over Police, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 14, 1992, at Al; L.A. Riots Had Parallel in the 60's Major
Change Called Vital to Break Cycle, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1992, at A8;
Matthew S. Scott et al., Resurrecting the City of Angels, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov.
1992, at 94.
171. See, e.g., Ice-T Mocks San Diego Police with "Cop Killer," JET, Oct. 19,
1992, at 36; Jack Miles, Blacks vs. Browns; African Americans and Latinos, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY COMPANY, Oct. 1992; Thom Duffy & Charlene Orr, Texas Police Protest
Ice-T Song, BILLBOARD, June 20, 1992, at 98; Robin Kelley, Straight from Underground
(How Rap Music Portrays Police), NATION, June 8, 1992, at 793.
172. SKOLNICK & FYFE, supra note 44, at 63. For a comprehensive analysis of the
relationship between police and the community, see HOWARD H. EARLE, POLICE-COM-
MUNITY RELATIONS: CRISIS IN OUR TIME (1967).
accused against deceptive police interrogation tactics in Miranda v.
Arizona. However, since the Miranda decision, the focus of the
Court has shifted from the rights of the accused to crime control
policies. There has been an increasing shift away from the "due pro-
cess" jurisprudence of the Warren Court to the "crime control" ju-
risprudence of the Rehnquist Court. 17 3 The result is that law
enforcement enjoys wide latitude at virtually every stage of the crim-
inal justice process, including interrogation.
Of course, there is no question that police interrogation of persons
suspected of crimes constitutes a necessary practice in the pursuit of
crime solving and justice. Under the proper circumstances, confes-
sions serve a useful social purpose. Because many criminal cases lack
witnesses or physical evidence, police often would be incapable of
collecting enough evidence to punish the wrongdoer without a con-
fession. Furthermore, as a practical matter, a confession often mini-
mizes the need for further police investigation and often leads to
conviction, both of which reduce costs to taxpayers. Nevertheless,
the potential for conflict arises because criminal offenders "ordina-
rily do not utter unsolicited, spontaneous confessions.." 174 Thus, the
police are confronted with the difficult task of procuring a confession
from a less than willing suspect.
The question is whether we value the attainment of a confession at
any price. Clearly, on one hand, society has a compelling interest in
keeping the guilty off the street. On the other hand, it also has a
compelling interest in preserving the Constitution and protecting in-
dividual rights. The Constitution safeguards all citizens, even those
accused of a crime, in order to protect the innocent. When a sus-
pect's constitutional rights are negated by deceptive police tactics,
we pay too high a price for the resulting confession. The risk of false
confessions is an unacceptable cost of certain deceptive police tactics.
Aside from the obvious risks to the life or liberty of the innocent
individual, society is at risk because a guilty person remains free. In
addition, police conduct which undermines the public trust creates a
173. David M. O'Brien, Thinking About Crime; the High Court Changes Course,
PUB. PERSP., Vol. 2, No. 5, at 6 (1991). O'Brien provides a comparison of the Warren,
Burger, and Rehnquist Court's record on state and federal criminal cases:
% decided no. of no. of
for gov't cases terms
Warren Court 36 527 16
Burger Court 65 552 16.5
Rehnquist Court 67 154 4
Id; see also DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS (3d ed. 1993); Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-
Minded?), The Burger Court, (Is It Really So Prosecution Oriented?), and Police Inves-
tigatory Practices, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T
82-86 (V. Blasi ed., 1983).
174. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at xvi.
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longterm problem of inefficient law enforcment because community
cooperation is the foundation for effective law enforcement.
The time has come for the Supreme Court to recognize the costs
of trickery and deception: the fundamental unfairness of the tactics
in our accusatorial system, a significant danger of false confessions,
and the fostering of police misconduct which undermines the public's
confidence in its law enforcement agents. Thus, a balance must be
struck in the law so that individual rights and public trust are not
forfeited in the process of bringing guilty persons to justice.
The law should evince two primary objectives. First, the Court
must provide suspects in custody the opportunity to make informed
and rational decisions about whether or not to incriminate them-
selves. Second, the Court must place greater constraints on police
activity. Unlike the Miranda Court, today's Court must explicitly
interdict the use of trickery to achieve these two objectives. The cur-
rent "totality of the circumstances" test is unworkable. The "totality
of the circumstances" approach proscribes the most blatant types of "
trickery only, but it fails to interdict more subtle psychological tac-
tics. Hence, the ambiguity of the test has led to the absence of
meaningful regulation of police conduct.
First, as mentioned above, suspects must have an opportunity to
make informed and rational decisions about whether or not to in-
criminate themselves. Plainly, a suspect cannot, adequately make
such a decision unless he or she is capable of understanding his or
her rights, as well as the potential consequences of cooperation.
Thus, as a threshold inquiry, the Court should look to the mental
capacity of the accused.
Current law dictates that absent coercive police activity, a sus-
pect's mental capacity is irrelevant to a voluntariness inquiry. 175
Only when evidence of coercive police activity is present will the
court consider the "totality of the circumstances," including a sus-
pect's mental capacity, to determine whether a waiver or confession
was voluntary.1 76
The current approach inadequately protects suspects who are so
psychologically vulnerable as to be incapable of making an intelli-
gent waiver of their Miranda rights.17 7 The law must protect the
175. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 167 (1986). See infra notes 91-92
and accompanying text.
176. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165-67.
177. Police can easily take advantage of inexperienced or ignorant suspects. See
supra notes 33-34, 117-21 and accompanying text. See also George E. Dix, Mistake,
Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U.
constitutional rights of all suspects, especially those suspects who are
incapable of protecting themselves. Therefore, if a judicial determi-
nation is made that a custodial suspect is incapable of making an
intelligent waiver, any incriminating statement made by the suspect
in the absence of counsel should be per se inadmissible. 17 Thus, even
in the absence of coercive police activity, the statements of a psycho-
logically vulnerable suspect would be excluded.
Attacks on such an approach would be concerned with whether
there is a practical process for determining whether or not a suspect
is capable of making an intelligent waiver. In People v. Bernasco,79
the Illinois Supreme Court employed the testimony of a psychologist
to determine whether a 17-year-old, ninth grade school drop out,
who had an I.Q. of 80, was capable of making a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of the Miranda warnings given to him by police while he
was in custody. Based on the testimony of the psychologist, the po-
lice, and the boy's parents, and based on the trial court's observa-
tions of the defendant while he was testfying, the court held the
defendant's burglary confession inadmissible. 180 Thus, as the Illinois
Supreme Court has demonstrated, this approach is practically feasi-
ble with the use of psychological evaluation and testimony, a judicial
aid which is certainly not new to the criminal law. Such a procedure
would safeguard each individual's right of due process and right
against self-incrimination.
If the Court determines that the mental state of the accused does
not clearly afford him or her special protection, the Court should
then proceed to carefully scrutinize the advisement of rights. It is
well settled that a failure to warn a custodial suspect of his or her
rights will result in an exclusion of .any resulting confession for the
purposes of establishing guilt.181 However, even when police actually
warn a suspect of his or her rights, police may still use trickery to
L.Q. 275; R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 Wri. &
MARY L. RPv. 15, 40-41 (1981).
178. Of course, this does not prevent police from interrogating the suspect in the
presence of counsel or, in the alternative, in order to gain corroborating evidence. Nor
does this rule prevent police from building a case with evidence other than a confession.
179. 138 Ill. 2d 349, 562 N.E.2d 958 (1990).
180. Id. at 368, 562 N.E.2d at 966; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157,
161 (1986). In Connelly, a psychiatrist employed by the state testified at a preliminary
hearing that the defendant was "suffering from chronic schizophrenia and was in a
psychotic state [at least starting] the day before he confessed." Id. He further testified
that the defendant's mental illness interfered with his "'ability to make free and rational
choices.'" Id. Nevertheless, the doctor testified that the defendant "understood the rights
he had when [the detectives] advised him that he need not speak." Id. at 161-62. On the
basis of this evidence, the Colorado trial court suppressed defendant's statements because
they were involuntary. Id. at 162.
181. E.g., People v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1481, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126
(1993).
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de-emphasize or misrepresent the nature and significance of the Mi-
randa warning. 8 2 When an interrogator misrepresents the signifi-
cance of the Miranda warning, the protective purpose of the warning
is not achieved; it is as if the suspect were not warned at all. The
Court must renew its emphasis on protecting defendants' constitu-
tional rights by requiring a substantive advisement of rights, in place
of the accepted formality it has become. If the warnings are to truly
safeguard defendants' rights, they ihust be given in a manner which
is meaningful. Therefore, the Court should carefully scrutinize the
warning of rights; if the interrogating officer failed to administer the
warning in a meaningful and scrupulous manner, the Court should
exclude the resulting confession.18 3
If the Court has determined that the defendant has had an oppor-
tunity to make an informed and rational decision about whether or
182. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
183. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1974). Perhaps one practical way to admin-
ister this requirement would be the mandatory recording of interrogations. With a word
for word transcript, blatant examples of meaningless and unscrupulous administration of
the warning of rights would not be difficult to detect. See, e.g., Esqueda, 17 Cal. App.
4th at 1474-76, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 140-41 (court used audio and video recordings to
determine that the "tenor of the questioning changed to accusations even before [the
defendant] was read his rights"); see supra note 75 and accompanying text. In fact, some
commentators suggest that all aspects of police interrogations should be mandatorily re-
corded to preserve the suspect's constitutional rights in the interrogation setting. Al-
though this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is worthwhile to consider how
this requirement would make the task of the reviewing court much more efficient. See
generally Ingrid Kane, Note, No More Secrets: Proposed Minnesota State Due Process
Requirement that Law Enforcement Officers Electronically Record Custodial Interroga-
tion and Confessions, 77 MINN. L. REV. 983 (1993). There is also evidence that while the
presence of recording devices has a limited impact only on a suspect's behavior, the pres-
ence of such devices substantially inhibits police misconduct. Michael McConville &
Philip Morrell, Recording the Interrogation" Have the Police Got it Taped?, 1983 CRIM.
L. REV. 158, 159-60. This suggests that adoption of recording requirements might be a
circuitous but effective way to encourage officers to exercise their best judgment in the
interrogation room. However, the "outrageous" conduct of interrogating officers who
knew they were being recorded in Esqueda suggests otherwise. 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1484,
22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 146. Perhaps the immediate advantage of mandatory recording
would be ease and efficiency of appellate review, which would, in turn, restrict police
activity longterm.
Another solution to the problem of the advisement of rights given in a meaningless
manner may perhaps be extrapolated from a proposal in the juvenile field. One author
has urged that the solution to the problem of juvenile comprehension of the warnings is
what he calls the "Youth Rights Form." Larry E. Holtz, Miranda in a Juvenile Setting:
A Child's Right to Silence, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 534, 549 (1987). The form
would consist of a highly simplified set of warnings, followed by questions. The questions
would require a "yes" or "no" answer as to whether the suspect understands each indi-
vidual right. Perhaps this approach could be adopted for the interrogation of adults. It
does not appear that a simplified advisement of rights would be more difficult or imprac-
tical to administer than the current advisement. Id. at 550-56.
not to incriminate herself, the Court should then turn its attention to
the practices of the police officers after the waiver was obtained,
Currently, once a waiver of rights is properly obtained, the suspect is
"fair game" for an endless array of deceptive tactics." Concededly,
"[z]ero-value pressure conditions" are impossible to achieve in inter-
rogation because all police questioning, whether custodial or not, cre-
ates some pressure on a criminal suspect. 185 Moreover, the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments do not, and should not, protect against all
the inherent pressures of police questioning if we wish for successful
law enforcement. As previously discussed, confessions can be ex-
tremely valuable when properly obtained. However, the Fifth
Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination does
indeed safeguard the suspect's choice to maintain silence. This right
to choose silence is a nullity if interrogators subject the suspect to
tactics which disable her from appreciating the significance or conse-
quences of a self-incriminating statement.
In general, the use of trickery and deception deprives a suspect of
the ability to appreciate her rights, and hence, the significance or
consequences of self-incrimination. However, such a generalization
lacks the detail necessary to institute a change in the law. Unless
offending tactics are clearly defined, reform will not occur in the iso-
lation of the interrogation room. Nebulous assertions that "trickery"
renders a resulting confession inadmissible are devoid of guidance
for courts and law enforcement officers alike. Therefore, Congress
must explicitly interdict the use of specific deceptive tactics.1 88
First, Congress must bar police from intentionally misrepresenting
a fact that, if true, would induce a suspect to confess. Thus, police
should be prohibited by statute from lying about the nature or
amount of evidence available against a suspect. This would include
both the production of false evidentiary documents as well as verbal
misrepresentions. Along the same lines, non-disclosure of a relevant
fact that might deter a suspect from confessing constitutes the func-
tional equivalent of active misrepresentation of an important fact.
Thus, it would be unquestionably impermissible for police to falsely
tell a suspect, for example, that a friend had implicated him or her,
or that the suspect's fingerprints were found on the murder weapon,
or that the suspect's semen was identified in the victim's underwear
through fictitious DNA tests. In addition, it would be impermissible
for a detective to conceal the fact that a victim of violence had in
fact died during the course of an interrogation.
184. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
185. YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 155 n.20 (1983).
186. The ideas expressed herein rely for guidance in part on the hypothetical
"Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine," in PHILLIP. E. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 540-50 (1988), and Sakasi, supra note 15, at 1598.
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Although the public has an interest in bringing the guilty to jus-
tice, police should not be permitted to lie to serve that end for three
reasons. First, public trust in law enforcement is integral to the effi-
cient administration and enforcement of the laws. Public cooperation
and the public's perceptions of police behavior are clearly interre-
lated;1 17 when the public's respect for the police is undermined, indi-
viduals might be less inclined to cooperate with law enforcement
efforts. Second, as the Cayward court argued, falsified documents
might taint the entire criminal justice system because of their appar-
ent authenticity. Furthermore, if police were allowed to lie in the
interrogation context, there would be little disincentive for police to
refrain from deception in other contexts, such as the courtroom. The
police must conform to society's expectancy of honesty and veracity
just like every other citizen; the police must obey the law while en-
forcing the law. Third, misrepresentations by police are violative of
the fundamental constitutional protections guaranteed each citizen
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Misrepresentations about
the evidence hinder the suspect's ability to assess whether or not to
remain silent. Because of these three reasons mentioned above, the
police should not be permitted to lie in order to serve the public's
interest in bringing the guilty to justice.
Second, Congress must prohibit police from intentionally misrep-
resenting the adversary nature of the interrogation. The leading po-
lice manual advocates stratagems designed to "decrease the suspect's
perception of the consequences of confessing" 8 by misrepresenting
the adversary nature of the relationship between the suspect and her
interrogators. When a detective is permitted to misrepresent the ago-
nistic nature of interrogation, the State has an unfair advantage over
the defendant.
The Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments reflect the tenet of
our adversarial system that the accused should have some equality to
protect his or her self-interest against criminal accusations by the
powerful state. 8 Part of a meaningful defense against any attack is
187. E.g., Florida v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 975 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
188. INBAU ET AL., supra note 2, at 332. For instance, the manual instructs the
interrogator not to take notes, because note taking "may grimly remind the suspect of
the legal significance or implication of an incriminating remark." Id. at 36. In addition,
the interrogator should wear civilian clothes, or the "suspect will be reminded constantly
of police custody and the possible consequences of an incriminating disclosure." Id. One
recent case reflects how interrogating officers follow these instructions to the letter. See
People v. Esqueda, 17 Cal. App. 4th 1450, 1466, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 126, 135 (1993)
(detective wore civilian clothing for the interviews and did not take any notes).
189. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964) ("no system of criminal justice
the identification of the opponent. At the very least, a criminal sus-
pect whose life or liberty may be at stake deserves the bare advan-
tage of identifying his chameleon-like adversary. 190 Because the
"relative strengths of the suspect and the police in this context" are
grossly disproportionate, the integrity of the defendant's constitu-
tional protections must be steadfastly safeguarded. 191 Furthermore,
if a suspect does not understand the nature of the interrogation, she
cannot accurately assess whether or not she should exercise her right
to assistance of counsel. Accordingly, a detective should not inten-
tionally misrepresent her role in the interrogation, whether an inter-
rogation is taking place, the seriousness of the proceedings, or the
possible consequences of a confession.
Third, Congress must codify and extend the existing judicial pro-
scriptions on trickery. As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court
has already proscribed the use of force, explicit threats of force, or
explicit promises of leniency. The rationale behind the prohibition of
these tactics is that they are so coercive as to induce an innocent
person to confess. This rationale, however, extends with equal force
to implicit threats and implicit promises. In support of this conclu-
sion, some courts have already held that a coercive promise "need
not be expressed, but may be implied. 1 92 Moreover, one research
team has studied and compared the communicative effects of permis-
sibly deceptive police interrogation ploys with impermissibly explicit
ploys. 193 The study focused on the techniques in Inbau, Reid, and
Buckley's nine-step plan, including offers of sympathy, excuses, and
can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for continued effetiveness on the citizens'
abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights"). See generally Greena-
walt, supra note 177.
190. This concern for constitutional rights should not be construed as a support of
the "sporting theory of justice," which contends that a guilty suspect, like a fox during a
hunt, must be given a sporting chance to escape conviction and punishment. Cf. 5 JER-
EMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238 (1827); 7 THE WORKS OF JER-
EMY BENTHAM 454 (Bowring ed. 1843) (author sharply criticizes the "fox-hunter's"
argument for excluding evidence). Rather, a criminal suspect is entitled by the Constitu-
tion not to be compelled to incriminate him or herself under the Fifth Amendment, nor
to be deprived of life or liberty without the due process of law under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Due process includes the defendant's right to confront adverse
witnesses against him or her. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment entitles all criminal
defendants with the right to be informed of the "nature and cause of the accusation,"
U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. The guarantee of these rights forms the fabric of our system of
criminal justice. Maintaining the integrity of a fair adversary system is not mere "sport."
When the protection of a defendant's rights is reduced to such a simplistic and cynical
analogy as a fox hunt, one could easily forget that although it is morally acceptable to
trap or kill an innocent fox in America, it is not similarly defensible to trap or kill an
innocent defendant.
191. White, supra note 10, at 604. See generally Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49, 54 (1962) (suspect is on "unequal footing with his interrogators").
192. People v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 549, 426 P.2d 908, 916, 58 Cal. Rptr. 340,
348 (1966).
193. Kassin & McNall, supra note 18.
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moral justification. The research indicates that these tactics implic-
itly communicate leniency expectations and threats of punishment to
suspects just as effectively as explicit promises or threats.9 The
only distinction between the currently permissible and impermissible
deceptions (implied vs. expressed) is one of form, not substance.
Therefore, Congress should (1) codify the settled judicial proscrip-
tions of explicit threats of force and explicit promises of leniency,
and (2) ban police interrogation tactics involving implicit threats or
promises. The broad category of implied promises should specifically
include offers of sympathy, excuses, and moral justification.
Realistically, even with legislation explicitly banning the above
three categories of trickery, the courts will inevitably be confronted
with subtle yet questionable tactics which fall outside of the statu-
tory framework. Only in the context of assessing the propriety of
these questionable tactics should courts look to the "totality of the
circumstances." Thus, only in the absence of a mandatory exclusion
of a confession by statute, courts would retain discretion to assess the
constitutionality of the interrogation, taking into account the aggre-
gate effect of relevant factors such as the length and form of the
questioning, the degree of the coercive nature of the tactics in ques-
tion, and the mental state of the accused. The retention of this test
in narrow circumstances would allow for flexibility, while the statu-
tory framework would substantially alleviate previous ambiguity.
Given the importance of confessions to law enforcement, police
should retain the ability to interrogate within the bounds of the Con-
stitution. For example, as long as an officer does not misrepresent the
evidence, the adversarial nature of the interrogation, or make threats
or promises (either explicit or implicit), an officer should not be re-
stricted from using certain verbal or behavioral techniques. For in-
stance, a detective might appeal to the suspect's sense of humanity,
compassion, or conscience. In addition, the detective might appeal to
the suspect's sympathy for the victim. Moreover, an officer should
not be restricted from honestly conveying information to the suspect,
such as information about available evidence against the suspect. On
the other hand, the Court should retain the authority to ensure that,
even when not statutorily prohibited, tactics employed by interro-
gators do not deprive a suspect of his or her constitutional rights.
In summary, the law regarding the admission of confessions
should change. First, when the mental capacity of the accused is
194. Id. at 247-50.
questionable, the Court should assess the defendant's mental state
using psychological evaluation and testimony. Once a judicial deter-
mination is made of a custodial suspect's inability to understand the
nature and significance of her Miranda waiver, her incriminating
statements should be per se inadmissible. In the alternative, if the
Court has determined that the mental state of the defendant should
not afford him or her heightened protection, the Court should then
determine whether the suspect was advised of his or her rights in a
manner which would enable the suspect to make a rational decision
about whether to waive them. If the advisement of rights was given
in a clearly meaningless and unscrupulous manner, the resulting con-
fession should be per se inadmissible. If the Court finds that the ad-
visement was 'proper, it should then scrutinize the conduct of the
police. The interrogation tactics should be analyzed to determine
whether any of three statutorily proscribed categories of trickery
were used: (1) intentional misrepresention of a fact that, if true,
would induce a suspect to confess (including lies about the nature or
amount of evidence available against a suspect); (2) intentional mis-
represention of the adversary nature of the interrogation; or (3) ex-
plicit or implicit promises of leniency or threats of harm. Finally, the
Court should examine the circumstances surrounding police tactics
which fall outside the statutory proscriptions to determine whether
the defendant was deprived of his constitutional rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Comment has argued that police should not be permitted to
use trickery and deception to obtain confessions during interrogation.
Although society has a compelling interest in effective law enforce-
ment, the official use of trickery and deception constitutes an im-
proper means of achieving that end.
Highly sophisticated interrogation techniques have been proven to
elicit false confessions from psychologically vulnerable suspects and
from suspects of normal intelligence alike. This danger of unreliable
confessions mandates a re-thinking of the interrogation process. Fur-
thermore, the basic tenet of our criminal justice system is that "ours
is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system."' 5 Under this sys-
tem of justice, the police have the duty to protect the individual
rights of all citizens, even those suspected of a crime. When an indi-
vidual is deprived of the fundamental fairness of our system, re-
flected in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, our entire
system has gone awry; justice has not been done. Moreover, the use
of police trickery and deception undermines public confidence in the
195. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
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police and the judicial system. In the harsh realities of modern urban
America, we can ill afford to lose public trust in and cooperation
with law enforcement if police officers hope to retain their control.
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